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Assume that all the resources needed for a particular
production process are already purchased. They represent sunk
costs to the production facility. The only cost of doing
business then is the cost incurred by producing unacceptable
goods. If finished goods are flawed or late when delivered
to the consumer in a market economy then the producer
eventually loses market share. Continued loss of market share
leads to annihilation of the production business. Thus, the
decision maker's task is to allocate the available resources
to achieve timely delivery of error-free products. This is
the situation in which some mid-level managers find
themselves. In other words, given little or no control over
the resources on hand, they are to perform as well as possible
but are not to fail.
The typical response to the mid-level manager's production
problem is to employ part of the allotted labor resources as
quality assurance inspectors. Use of labor resources as
inspectors rather than producers decreases production. The
time required to conduct the inspections slows the remaining
production. The use of the inspectors, however, decreases the
number of flaws in the finished product. The manager faces
a tradeoff between two favorable objectives: better finished
products versus more finished products.
Assume that all worker errors in the production process
that can lead to a flawed finished product can be identified.
Assume that each worker error^ (where i = l,...,m) is
independent and mutually exclusive of each other. Therefore,
given that a flawed product is found bearing the effects of
one error from the production process:
(1-1) 1 P (error.) =1,0
i = l
Assume a cost distribution can be identified for error.
From those distributions assume that mean costs can be
derived. Now the expected cost of doing business (EC) per
each item produced can be written:
m
(1-2) I P (error,) * C (error.) = EC
i = l
where m is the number of independent errors
P is "probability"
C is "mean cost"
The probability for a flawed finished product due to error
on task^ [ P ( error^ ) ] is the probability that both the
worker erred on the task and the inspector failed to identify
the worker's error. The inspector's ability to positively
identify flawed products as being unacceptable increases over
time. Naturally, the cost of doing business can be reduced
if the allocation of available inspector time can be driven
toward errors that occur more frequently and which have
greater cost. How should the available inspection time be
divided between error-prone tasks to best reduce the cost of
doing business? The focus of this thesis is how to allocate
the available inspection time to best accomplish the manager's
multiple objectives of speed and thoroughness.
Goal programming is a convenient tool for simultaneously
satisfying several objectives. The first half of this thesis
proposes a methodology for allocating inspection time based
on goal programming. The second half uses the artillery gun
chief's inspection problem to illustrate the methodology.
In offering a solution to the allocation of inspection
time problem, the thesis uses several timely, efficient, and
sound techniques to derive a deterministic probability for
worker failure on each error-prone task, the expected time
that an inspector spends inspecting each task, and the cost
distribution of error on each task. The hope is that these
techniques are sufficiently convenient that they can be
readily adopted by mid-level managers in their allocation of
inspection resource problems.
B. DEFINITIONS
Some terminology is peculiar to the study of human
reliability. Other terminology is peculiar to the U.S. Army
and the field artillery. Appendix F contains a glossary of
those terms.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter 2 presents the experimental results and theories
that are the underpinnings of the proposed methodology for
solving the allocation of inspection time problem. The
chapter documents alternative techniques by which error rates
and time estimates may be derived other than by empirical
observation. The chapter reviews a technique for estimating
costs of errors and discusses the attributes of goal
programming
.
Chapters 3 through 5 present the problem that illustrates
the proposed methodology. Chapter 3, Background to the
Artillery Problem, describes the allocation of inspection time
problem as it applies to the gun section and the artillery
fire support system. The discussion of artillery explains the
tasks of the various crewmen and the errors they make.
Chapter 4 develops a model for the artillery gun chief's
problem. Chapter 5 applies the methodology to an active army
unit at Fort Ord, California. Chapter 6, Conclusions and
Recommendations, proposes other applications of this
methodology and suggests areas for future research. The
appendices give the output from the computer runs discussed
in Chapter 5, the surveys of respondents, and step-by-step
procedures for computing the solution to the artillery gun
chief's inspection problem.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF A VISUAL INSPECTION MODEL
A. GENERAL
1. Need for a Model over Intuition
Often the allocation of inspection time to various
inspection tasks is determined by the inspector. It is
generally expected that an inspector will employ his full
experience, knowledge, and intuition when deciding how to
spend his time on the various visual inspection tasks he must
perform. Intuition is inadequate for such tasks as allocating
inspection time. Hogarth identifies the primary weakness in
reliance on intuition in general:
One could suppose that through intuitive judgment people
are able to capture important information which escapes
codification and is thus not amenable to statistical
analysis. Indeed, intuitive judgment does capture much
information, however, it is inconsistent. Moreover such
inconsistency necessarily attenuates human predictive
validity. In other words, although humans may on occasion
exhibit high accuracy in judgment, inability to apply
judgmental rules consistently across a series of cases
means that on average models outpredict people. [Ref 2,
p. 194]
Over the long run, a model that incorporates all available
knowledge regarding inspection phenomenon and allocates
inspection time accordingly will outperform any inspector's
intuition.
A mathematical model of the inspection process offers
many advantages over reliance on the intuition of an
inspector. First, a model offers a means to understand the
underlying causes and effects occurring in the inspection
phenomena. Reliance on inspector's intuition offers no
alternative method to solve inadequacies should intuition
start failing. With a model there is the means to test
alternative solutions. Gass states.
It (a mathematical model) enables us to evaluate the
effects of a change of one variable on all the other
variables; it provides us with a quantitative basis to
sharpen and evaluate our intuition of the process under
investigation. . . Mathematical models enable us to bring
some semblance of scientific methodology to areas of
decision making heretofore characterized by intuition and
experience. [Ref 42, p. 26-27]
Morse and Kimball write, "Operations research is a
scientific method of providing executive departments with a
quantitative basis for decisions regarding operations under
their control [Ref 19, p 7]." Building effective mathematical
models of the inspection process allows managers to take
control of their inspection resources and make optimal use of
them in support of production facility goals and values. If
inspectors are not brought in to support the goals and values
of the production facility they are apt to pursue their own
set of goals and values. Hillier and Lieberman allude to what
then tends to happen "...(there is) a tendency for many
components of an organization to grow into relatively
autonomous empires with their own goals and value systems [Ref
5, p 3]."
Inspector time is a resource of the manager and, as
such, it should support the production facility's goals and
values. If the manager can quantify his goals with respect
to product quality then goal programming allows him to model
his inspection time problem. The model gives him the means
to simultaneously consider his goals and allocate inspector's
time to satisfy those goals.
2. Modeling of the Inspection Process
The purpose of the inspection process is to identify
worker errors that affect the system. The model of the
inspection process must incorporate the effect that the errors
potentially have on the system. Thus, a large part of
modeling the inspection process is error analysis.
The importance of an error is directly related to its
potential for unacceptable system effects. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) makes this point in regard to
errors in general
:
The importance of an error is a function of its frequency,
the efficiency of the (inspector) for the error, and the
likelihood and severity of the potential consequences of
the error... [Ref 14, p 4-17].
In applying this same concept to the realm of human error,
Pickrel and McDonald write:
The extent and cost of efforts to eliminate sources of
human errors should be commensurate with:
1
)
the frequency with which the error is expected to
occur;
2) the frequency with which a (system) failure will
occur as a result of the error; and
3) the possible consequences of the failure
condition. [Ref 27, p 649]
Swain points the direction for the modeling of the inspection
process when he writes:
Errors are important only if they lead to important
consequences. Thus, the steps in error analysis are
a) Identify the consequences of interest;
b) Identify all errors that can lead to those
consequences
;
c) Determine error rates for each class of errors;
d) Identify the likely contributing factors.
[Ref 10, p. 14]
The probability of worker error, the probability of associated
inspector error, and the cost of associated product flaws are
the parameters needed to establish the relative importance of
the different errors. These parameters must then be brought
together in one model to represent the inspection process.
This chapter reviews the rationale for using the
opinions of subject-matter experts to both estimate the
probability for worker error and to estimate the time required
to inspect for that worker error. Theories and experiments
dealing with the probability for inspector failure as a
dealing with the probability for inspector f ai lure as a
function of time to inspect and a method for cost estimation
of system error are reviewed.
Another area discussed in the model development is the
importance of internal consistency in judgments made by
subject-matter experts before their subjective evaluations
have merit. Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy Process [Ref 17] is
reviewed for its method of evaluating the internal consistency
in a respondent. Also, in this chapter, goal programming is
reviewed as a means to model problems such as the allocation
of inspection resources problem. The goal program that
achieves this allocation of inspector time is relatively
simple and straightforward. The challenge is developing the
probabilities for error and the costs of error required by the
model and the goal program.
B. THE PROBABILITY OF CREW ERROR
1. Rationale for Subjective Evaluations
Research into human reliability and error analysis led
to work by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) in its
evaluation of human error probability in the operation of
nuclear power plants. The NRC is at the forefront in research
on human error and design of functional, safe systems that
incorporate human error rates.
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Traditional thinking is that personal opinion of
people with working experience is worth little as a basis for
good operations research work. Morse and Kimball were
emphatic about this when they helped found operations
research:
The opinions of a few dozen persons who have had
operational experience provide an extremely shaky
foundation for any operations research. . .The need for
unbiased, impersonal facts, not opinions, must always be
borne in mind. [Ref 19, p 8-9]
This influence is still clear today as there is often an
aversion to using operational experience as a basis for
operations research. Echoing the sentiments of Morse and
Kimball is the following more recent comment by Von
Winterfeldt and Edwards that typifies the views of many
systems analysts about the appropriate way to assess
probabilities
:
By far the most common practical procedure for assessing
probabilities is to collect a large set of observations
and then to use a relative frequency. This procedure is
tedious but the existence of empirical science testifies
to its success. [Ref 29, p. 110]
Whereas probabilities for equipment failure may be
best established by the strict empirical approach, it is
unlikely that probabilities for human failure (human error)
can be gathered in that manner. Swain and Miller provide a
discussion of the reasons human error data generally cannot
be obtained through empirical observations [Ref 1, p 226].
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Horley and Giordano give a graphic example of failure of the
empirical approach to obtain human error data on artillery gun
sections in U.S. Army tests conducted at Fort Hood, Texas [Ref
15, p. 67-73]. Swain and Guttman discuss why the empirical
approach to generating human error data has not worked in
nuclear power plants:
The collection of relative frequencies (for human error
rates by empirical observation) is impractical for several
reasons.
First, error probabilities for many tasks are very
small. Therefore, in any reasonable time period, not
enough errors will occur to permit the fitting of a
meaningful distribution to the observed error relative
frequencies.
Second, usually there is some penalty associated with
the commission of an error, which discourages the
identification of individuals who commit the errors. If
such identification were insisted upon, there would be
some unknown, but sizeable, number of errors not reported.
Third, the administrative problems and costs of
recording and analyzing errors by person would probably
be unacceptable. [Ref 14, p. 6-2]
There are numerous activities in need of human
reliability data for enhanced man-machine system design. In
most of these activities there is extensive operational
experience, but there is little or no human error data.
Expert judgment provides a means to generate human error data.
Swain states.
The use of collective judgment by subject-matter experts
is one way to make up for the paucity of empirical error
rate data. Studies indicate that it would be feasible to
have a number of people with detailed knowledge of various
12
tasks in an industrial setting rank-order tasks in terms
of error-likeliness. [Ref 10, p. 101]
Miller and Swain briefly describe how the methods that use
expert judgment to generate human error data are structured:
Subject-matter experts judge the relative or absolute
likelihood of error for several task descriptions, and
these responses are converted to usable human error
probabilities by mathematical scaling techniques. [Ref 1,
p. 238]
The NRC endorses four methods for eliciting expert
judgment input to estimate human error probabilities. The NRC
makes the following exhortation in regards to these methods:
Make the best use possible of current procedures and
information, even though they may be flawed. . .These (the
four methods endorsed by the NRC) are based on sound
psychological theory and empirical support that indicate
their potential usefulness. And as a practical matter,
they can be used now to obtain needed human error
probabilities. [Ref 14, p 8-6]
The NRC approved methods are the paired comparisons procedure,
ranking and rating procedure, direct numerical estimation
procedure, and indirect numerical estimation procedure. Swain
and Guttman [Ref 14, p. 8-6 to 8-13] and Seaver and Stillwell
[Ref 28, p A-2 to A-51] provide detailed explanations of each
of the NRC approved methods.
2. Experts to Supply Expert Judgment
Embrey noted that his whole approach to developing
human error probabilities by subjective input was contingent
on judges. He writes:
The success of the approach is likely to be critically
dependent on the knowledge and experience that the judges
13
possess regarding the tasks they are asked to assess. For
this reason it is very important that strenuous attempts
are made to obtain appropriately qualified judges. [Ref
28, p. 30]
In commenting about eliciting judgments of uncertainty (or
probabilities) from people. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards write:
If a numerical measure of uncertainty is an opinion, it
characterizes a person as well as an event; we want to
elicit from the right person. Who is that?.. [Ref 29, p.
113]
The "right person" is the one who has the best understanding
of the phenomenon under investigation and who can best relate
that understanding in terms that can be quantified.
Swain offers that the worker or inspector himself is
an expert on error rates:
Subject-matter experts are persons who are especially
knowledgeable about the tasks for which error rates are
to be derived. Thus, if one wanted to derive error rate
estimates for new tasks in an assembly plant, the experts
would be persons who perform or had performed similar
tasks in an assembly plant. [Ref 10, p. 101]
Saaty agrees. Saaty not only allows that the worker or
inspector is an expert in the operational aspects of his work,
but he implies that he also is the best person for relating
to others phenomena about that work:
We generally agree that people who experience a phenomenon
firsthand are the ones who can best shed light on our
understanding of it; indeed, knowledge derived from
experience is basic to all understanding. [Ref 17, p. 9]
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Lai, Shenoi, and Fan suggest that workers and inspectors are
specifically well-equipped to estimate probabilities
concerning errors and hazards:
One of the major problems facing many quantitative risk
assessment studies is the lack of proper data about the
probabilities of occurrence of hazardous events. Often,
the only alternative is to employ rough estimates provided
by operations personnel.... Human beings often possess
quality knowledge that arises out of their insights and
experiences. When the safety of a system is being
examined this expertise has the greatest weight. [Ref 40,
p. 136]
While the worker and inspector are certainly experts
on the operational aspect of the human error phenomenon that
is a subject of this study, the question remains whether they
can relate this expert understanding in terms that permit
quantification.
3. Indirect Numerical Estimation Technique
Miller and Swain write that a major disadvantage of
methods that use expert judgment to generate human error data
is that the expert often lacks sufficient familiarity with
probabilities to be able to give meaningful input [Ref 1, p.
244] . Persons with operational experience, such as workers
and inspectors, are often not qualified to give a direct
numerical estimate of a probability. Paulos states, "An
appreciation for probability takes a long time to develop.
[Ref 7, p. 133]." Morse and Kimball warn, "People seldom
estimate random events correctly .. .their opinions are nearly
15
always unconsciously biased [Ref 19, p. 8]." Swain cautions:
It is not suggested that (subject-matter) experts be asked
to make estimates of actual error rates for tasks. Such
estimates would tend to vary widely and would generally
underestimate the true error rates. Some subject-matter
experts simply would refuse to make such estimates. [Ref
10, p 101]
Hogarth states.
People do have difficulty in expressing their degree of
knowledge in the precise quantitative form demanded by
probability theory. . . . Numerous studies have shown
fallibilities in intuitive attempts to guess probabilistic
relations from given facts. [Ref 2, p. 192]
Embrey shows that, when giving uncertainty judgments,
respondents do significantly better when dealing with
likelihood ratios and odds rather than probabilities. Embrey
concludes, "that judges (subject-matter experts) are best at
making simple directional judgments of the form 'task A is
more likely to be successful than task B' [Ref 28, p 9]."
Swain's work supports Embrey ' s . Swain adds:
Persons who will not guess at the probability of a
particular event will readily rank-order several events
in terms of increasing difficulty, hazard, or other
dimension, and they will do this ranking with great
confidence. [Ref 10, p. 101]
Miller and Swain comment, "Humans are very capable of making
qualitative judgments along one dimension [Ref 1, p. 238]."
Estimation methods for human error probability that
allow a person without probability-estimating skills to relate
his expert understanding of error phenomena by simple
directional judgments could be very useful. Of the four
16
expert judgment methods proposed by the NRC, two methods are
based upon simple directional judgments: paired comparisons
and indirect numerical estimation.
A problem with paired comparisons is the large number
of judges required to obtain valid estimates of the task
positions on a subjective scale. The relative frequency by
which one task is rated more likely to fail than another by
a large pool of experts is what leads to a scaled value for
that task. If there are only five judges providing input then
there are insufficient observations to be significant.
The indirect numerical estimation method of obtaining
human error probabilities from expert judgement is a robust
procedure and is the primary procedure for estimating human
error rates pursued in this thesis. Like paired comparisons,
it depends mostly on human qualitative versus quantitative
judgments. The indirect numerical estimation method asks the




Is this task error more or less likely than that task
error?
2) How much more or how much less likely is the first
task error versus the second task error?
A detailed discussion of the conversion of these expert
judgments to human error data by the indirect numerical
17
estimation method is given by Seaver and Stillwell [Ref 12]
.
A summary of that process is given in the example below.
Using the one-by-one comparisons given by a
respondent, a subjective scale of likelihood is generated.
Assume a respondent gives these likelihoods for four mutually
exclusive, independent task errors that encompass the entire
set of errors that can occur on a given system:
Task A error is twice as likely as Task B error.
Task B error is just as likely as Task C error.
Task C error is three times as likely as Task D error.
The likelihood of task error for all tasks can simply be
written in terms of any one task error. In the example, use
D as the base scale:
Task A error = 6 X (Task D error)
Task B error = 3 X (Task D error)
Task C error = 3 X (Task D error)
Task D error = 1 X (Task D error)
If the probability of any one task error is known or estimated
from some other source (Task D for example) then the
probabilities of all four events are known.
If the error probabilities are normalized, then the
probability for error in any one task is known, given that an
error occurs. Normalization takes place in the example
problem:
18
' 6D + 3D + 3D + ID = 1.00
D = .0769
Therefore, given an error occurs on the system, the
probability that it was:
Task A error is 46%
Task B error is 23%
Task C error is 23%
Task D error is 8%
These probabilities for task error apply to one respondent.
The next topic concerns the number of respondents
needed to generate good point estimates of the error data
being studied. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards state, "Both
theory and evidence teach us to use more than one respondent
whenever we can. [Ref 29, p. 113)." Guttman and Swain,
commenting on the indirect numerical estimation technique,
cite the work of Von Holstein in stating, "as with direct
numerical estimation, little is gained by using more than six
experts [Ref 14, p A-46]." Hogarth writes:
...judgments between individuals are likely to be
correlated. Thus one is often averaging redundant
information with the result that beyond a certain point
gains in adding experts to a group are small. It has been
estimated that in most predictive situations involving the
use of experts there is little point in averaging more
than about ten persons and that six or seven will often
be sufficient. [Ref 2, p 195]
The next subject is the aggregating of several
individual likelihood estimates to a single estimate
19
applicable to the entire production facility. Many schemes
exist for combining several likelihood estimates into a single
estimate. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards offers this insight:
Since proper scoring rules are convex functions on the
probability simplex, the score of the average of
individual probabilities will necessarily be better than
the average of the individual's scores. [Ref 29, p. 133]
The authors continue with this straightforward recommendation:
Simply elicit the desired uncertainty measures from each
member individually. . . . Transform the results into
probabilities and average them. The odds seem excellent
that, if you do anything more complex, you will simply be
wasting your effort. [Ref 29, p. 136]
This thesis pursues the method recommended by Von Winterfeldt
and Edwards.
4. Consistency in Expert Judgment
Workers and inspectors are typically trained to simply
perform the tasks required in their jobs. They are not
routinely trained to make quantitative judgments about
phenomena relating to their work. When asked to make
quantitative judgments it can be expected that some personnel
are overwhelmed with the requirement and thus fail to provide
valid input. It would be helpful to have a means to screen
the incoming data to eliminate surveys of those respondents
who were incapable or unwilling to provide valid data.
Consistency on the part of a respondent is some
measure of objectivity, internal logic, and operational
experience. Saaty defines the term:
20
The meaning of consistency is that the intensities of
relations among ideas or objects based on a particular
criterion justify each other in some logical way. (Ref
17, p 18)
Some measure of consistency is necessary to establish the
credibility of the expert whose judgments will eventually
affect a final decision. Saaty states, "We do not want the
decision to be based on judgments that have such low
consistency that they appear random (Ref 17, p. 82)."
Stillwell and Seaver add, "High levels of inconsistency would
suggest the entire judgmental process is suspect (Ref 13,
p. 32)." A way to identify inconsistent respondents is to
require them to make more pairwise ratio judgments than
absolutely necessary and then use those judgments to check the
respondent's internal consistency. Seaver and Stillwell
describe how this works for the indirect numerical estimation
method of obtaining human error probabilities:
To obtain a complete set of probabilities for N events
only requires a minimum of N-1 such judgments and an
independent estimate of the human error probability of
one event. Additional judgments, however, may be obtained
as consistency checks. [Ref 12, p A-46]
When more pairwise ratio judgments are made by a respondent
than is absolutely necessary there will most likely be some
inconsistency. Stillwell and Seaver remind that, "Some
inconsistencies enter into all judgmental processes. (Ref 13,
p.32)" Saaty argues that some amount of inconsistency is
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necessary as humans adapt to an ever-changing world. Saaty
states:
We may not be perfectly consistent, but that is the way
we tend to work. It is also the way we grow. When we
integrate new experiences into our consciousness, previous
relationships may change and some consistency is lost.
[Ref 17, p 82]
A level of consistency is desirable to establish
respondent validity and expertise. A level of inconsistency,
however, is to be expected among human judgment. Saaty
comments, "As long as there is enough consistency to maintain
coherence among the objects of our experience, the consistency
need not be perfect [Ref 17, p. 82]." There is a definite
need to establish an acceptable level of inconsistency in a
judge, beyond which the judgments are discarded as invalid.
To obtain some measure of consistency Saaty suggests
the development of an (N X N) reciprocal matrix where N
represents the number of items for comparison. A respondent
makes a ratio comparison between every two possible items such
that a total of (N) X (N-l)/2 judgments are made. The (N X
N) matrix is filled in with ones down the main diagonal, the
(N) X (N-l)/2 judgments fill the lower triangular matrix below
the diagonal of ones, and the reciprocals of the judgments
fill the upper triangular matrix above the diagonal of ones.
The maximum eigenvalue (X„ax) ^°^ this matrix is a
measure of consistency of the judgments in the matrix. Saaty
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proves that, "A positive reciprocal matrix is consistent if
and only if k^^^ is equal to N. (Ref 16, p. 181)" Saaty then
turns A„ax into a consistency index (CI) by the following
operation:
(2-1) [ X„^-N ] / [ N-1 ] = CI.
Saaty suggests that comparing the CI of a set of respondents'
judgments against that CI found by a randomly generated
reciprocal matrix should give a general measure of the
consistency called the consistency ratio ( CR )
:
(2-2) ( Clj-ggpon^ent ) / ( ^ ^random matrix) ~ ^^ •
The random entries in the random reciprocal matrix are chosen
by computer from the range of possible values used by the
respondents on their original survey. Several hundred random
matrices are computed with respective CIs for each. Those CIs
are then averaged to obtain a mean CI for a random matrix.
Appendix D shows the table for judgments limited to a one to
nine scale and describes the generation of the table in more
detail
.
Saaty provides a general rule for acceptable
consistency ratio values with which he had success in his
work. Saaty maintains that a consistency ratio less that 0.1
demonstrates acceptable consistency and that a respondent
providing such consistency is giving judgments worth
considering in decision-making. [Ref 17, p. 83]
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A disadvantage of Saaty's method is the number of
judgments required of each respondent. In a 4 X 4 matrix an
expert makes only six judgments [(4 X 3) / 2]. In a 10 X 10
matrix an expert must make 45 judgments [(10 X 9) / 2]. Saaty
suggests extensive use of hierarchies so that the number of
judgments are reduced. For example, if the 10 X 10 matrix
could be partitioned to sets of four, three, and three for
pairwise ratio comparisons then the number of judgments is
reduced from 45 to 15. Figure 1 depicts the reduction of
required judgments that is accomplished by use of a hierarchy.
Saaty's method is the method pursued in this thesis
for establishing sufficiently consistent input for
consideration in decision making,
C. THE PROBABILITY OF INSPECTOR ERROR
1. Inspectors Make Mistakes
Traditionally inspectors are viewed as a panacea for
production problems. Many production and quality assurance
plans are premised on an assumption of 100% accuracy on the
part of inspectors. Inspectors are not perfect. Swain makes
this clear.
There is no point in arguing whether people should make
errors. We all do. Human error rates, like material
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Drury makes this call to action:
Intrinsically, man is rarely perfect in either detection
or diagnosis. . .This has led in recent years to studies
which have demonstrated the effects inspector's errors can
have. . .and the need to take account of realistic values
of inspector's errors. [Ref 9, p. 11]
To decrease the error rate some form of data collection is
necessary to make a quantitative assessment of inspector
error. Bennett emphasizes this point:
So what must be done to achieve quality objectives given
that inspection error is to be ever present? The answer
is simple. The quality control engineer must be able to
accurately measure these errors and then be able to design
for them. [Ref 9, p.l]
2. The Direct Relationship: the More Time Inspector
Takes, the Greater the Inspector Accuracy
An appealing method for viewing inspector error
probability was introduced by Wreathall in work for the NRC.
Wreathall's Operator-Action Tree method (OAT) is depicted in
Figure 2.
The OAT approach is based on the assumption that human








The basic operator-action tree is based on the potential
for error in each of the three activities.
The second major assumption is that time available for
diagnosis is the dominant factor determining the
probability for failure. That is, given a short period
of time, people will fail to diagnose a situation
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correctly more often than when given a longer period. [Ref 1,
p. 236]
BASIC OPERATOR ACTION TREE
OPCRATOR OPERATOR ORERATOR
EVENT OBSERVES DIAGNOSES CARRIES OUT SUCCESS/
OCCURS INDICATIONS PROBLEM REQUIRED RESPONSE FAILURE
SOURCE: NUREG/CR-SOIO
Figure 2 - Operator-Action Tree
The intuitive appeal for the first assumption is overwhelming.
An inspector must "see", or visually fixate, on the event.
He must be trained sufficiently to be able to discriminate
error in the object of his fixation. Finally, the inspector
must be able to respond properly to overcome the error.
Failure to accomplish any one of these three steps will result
in inspector failure on the task.
Not only does the second assumption, that less time
available means more inspector errors, make intuitive sense,
but there is strong experimental basis for it. Drury's work
with flat glass inspectors [Ref 26, p. 265], Buck's experiments
with Landolt rings [Ref 9, p. 169], and Rizzi's tests with
flawed dot patterns on cards [Ref 25, p. 279] convincingly
demonstrate that inspector errors increase with less exposure
27
time to the object being inspected. Drury summed up his work
and that of Smith and Barany [Ref 22] when he wrote:
In all of the studies, a similar effect is observed, in
that as more time is allowed to inspect each item, the
probability of rejecting a faulty item increases whilst
the probability of accepting a good item decreases. [Ref
32, p. 6]
Drury suggests something akin to OAT:
The inspection mechanism postulated is a visual search
until either a potential defect is found or time runs out
for that item, followed by a decision about the potential
defect as to whether it is acceptable or rejectable. [Ref
32, p. 6]
Just as the OAT method suggests, a visual search must take
place until the inspector "sees" the prospective error. This
success of the visual search is no doubt a function of many
factors. The experimental evidence reviewed points strongly
to time available to the inspector as the most significant
factor to whether the search will be successful or not. If
the search leads to a prospective error then the inspector
must decide whether to accept or reject the object bearing the
prospective error. This decision involves experience of the
inspector, remaining time available to the inspector, and
costs and payoffs relating to finding errors.
Smith and Barany found signal detection theory helpful
in describing the decision an inspector must make [Ref 22,
p. 300]. Drury also used signal detection theory to model
inspector decision performance [Ref 32, p. 2-6]. Chapman and
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Sinclair give this opinion of the application of signal
detection theory to their study of inspection work:
Perhaps the most important thing to emerge from this study
is the usefulness of the theory of signal detection in
industrial inspection situations both from a theoretical
and a practical point of view. The theoretical value lies
in the insights it provides into an inspection task, and
the practical value arises from the fact that it allows
economic justification for the application of ergonomics
to inspection, and the rel-ative ease with which
recommendations for improvement can be derived. [Ref 9,
p. 241]
The basics of signal detection theory were established
by the pioneering work of Tanner, Swets, Birdsall, and Green
between 1954 and 1966 [Ref 8, p. 18]. Figure 3 is the common
depiction of the theory applied to the inspector's decision
[Ref 9, p. 14]. The detection of signals is assumed by the
theory to involve two processes: discrimination (d') and
decision (y3). Discrimination (d') requires the inspector to
be capable of distinguishing between success and error on a
task he is inspecting.
Discrimination is affected by such things as the
experience of the inspector (more experience tends to make d'
larger) and the time available to perform the inspection (more
time tends to make d' larger). Decision (y5) requires the
inspector to accept or reject what he sees. A decision (where
the point yS is between the two modal values of the Gaussian
curves) is influenced by such things as the inspector's
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Figure 3 - Signal Detection Theory [Ref 9, p. 14]
subjective probability that an error will occur (if he thinks
errors are very likely then he is more likely to reject) and
his attitude toward risk. [Ref 8, p. 18-21]
Smith and Barany explain in terms of signal detection
theory what transpires to cause a reduction in inspector
accuracy with a decrease in time available. Smith and Barany
write
:
If the pace of the inspection task is increased, then the
inspector will have less time in which to make his
observation, and his observing mode will tend toward that
described as "blurred observing"
.
[Ref 22, p. 300]
The effect of "blurred observing" is to decrease
discriminability (d'). With discriminability (d') reduced
there is more" overlap of the two Gaussian curves (see Figure
3) and whatever decision (p) is made must result in either
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more Type I or Type II errors. Smith and Barany conducted
experiments which demonstrated what signal detection theory
postulated.
The experimental results from Drury [Ref 26]; Rizzi,
Buck, and Anderson [Ref 25]; and Smith and Barany [Ref 22]
noted above are for relatively simple inspection tasks along
one dimension (flaws in sheet glass, numbers of holes in
disks, dots on cards) as opposed to more complex tasks with
a multitude of possible errors on several dimensions (circuit
boards, silicon chips). For simple inspection tasks the
experimental results clearly show a direct relationship
between inspector time to observe and inspector accuracy.
Schoonard emphasized this point with an experiment where seven
different classes of errors were possible on circuit boards.
The inspection tasks for the seven classes were ranked from
simplest to most difficult. A deliberate slowing of the
inspection time resulted in marked improvement on the more
simple inspection tasks but not so great an improvement on the
other, more difficult inspection tasks. [Ref 24, p. 368-376]
Drury predicted this finding by signal detection theory
principles. In reference to simple inspection tasks Drury
wrote.
For simple discriminations (such as the Smith and Barany
experiments) the discriminability will be high enough to
give almost perfect inspection as the time allowed is
increased. [Ref 32, p. 7]
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It is clear from experimental results that simple inspection
task accuracy improves with time.
The nature of the relationship between time taken by
inspector and his accuracy was explored by both Rizzi, Buck,
and Anderson [Ref 25, p. 279] and Drury [Ref 26, p. 265].
Drury found an exponential relationship between the
cumulative probability of locating a flaw in sheet glass and
time taken to inspect. Rizzi, Buck, and Anderson conducted
tests on subjects inspecting small cards with dots. Similar
to Drury 's results, Rizzi, Buck, and Anderson also found the
inspector's exposure time to the object exerted an exponential
effect on the probability of a correct detection. Figure 4
shows the results of Drury ' s and Smith and Barany's work with
the effect of time on the probability of inspector accuracy.


















Drury [Ref 26, p. 264] Smith and Barany [Ref 32, p. 5]
Figure 4 - Inspector Accuracy as a Function of Time
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3. Limits to the Direct Relationship
It would seem that there must be some limit to the
direct relationship that more time spent by an inspector
yields more inspector accuracy. This section reviews
experimental results that confirm both lower and upper bounds
to this direct relationship.
a. Minimum Time is Limited by Time Required for
Visual Fixation
The lower bound for this direct relationship is
the physical limitation of the human eye to focus and fixate
on any visual stimuli and the brain to comprehend what the eye
is seeing. Experimental results revealing what might be a
minimum time for the eye to fixate and the brain to begin to
function for inspection purposes are offered by Drury. Drury
concluded from his experimental results that it took seven
tenths of a second (700 milliseconds) for his subjects to open
and focus their eyes and begin searching for errors. [Ref 26,
p. 250]. During that initial time from zero to seven tenths
of a second there is no increase in inspector accuracy.
b. Maximum Time is Limited by Human Vigilance
The upper bound for the direct relationship of
more time resulting in more accuracy is the result of
decreased vigilance that occurs when an inspector exceeds his
attention span. Chapman and Sinclair [Ref 9], Kochhar and
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Jaisingh [Ref 23] , and Schoonard, Gould, and Miller [Ref 24]
demonstrated upper bounds to the direct relationship that was
found by Drury [Ref 26]; Rizzi, Buck, and Anderson [Ref 25];
and Smith and Barany [Ref 22] . Experiments by Chapman and
Sinclair of experienced personnel inspecting poultry carcasses
at a meat processing plant [Ref 9, p. 231] and the work of
Kochhar and Jaisingh with experienced inspectors checking
products on a CRT screen [Ref 23, p. 44] are two examples of
note. Both showed initial improvement in inspector accuracy
as time was increased, just as Drury and others had noted.
At a point, however. Chapman and Sinclair [Ref 9] and Kochhar
and Jaisingh [Ref 23] reported a degradation in inspector
accuracy when inspectors were made to take more time in their
visual inspection tasks. Schoonard, Gould, and Miller
reported similar findings with their experienced inspectors
who were checking circuit boards for any of seven different
classes of errors that might be present. As Schoonard, Gould,
and Miller increased the inspection time to 1.5 times the
standard time the inspectors spent on their tasks, significant
improvement resulted across all seven classes of error-types.
With any additional increases over the 1.5 times the standard
time for the inspectors, there was no improvement in inspector
accuracy. [Ref 24, p. 355]. Chapman and Sinclair offer a
possible explanation for this degradation phenomenon with
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increase in inspector time;
...during the course of such a task periods of inattention
occur which become more frequent or prolonged as
presentation time increases. ... A possible answer (for the
prolonged periods of inattention) may be that the human
organism maintains a homeostatic level of arousal, and if
this is dependent on incoming stimuli, it could be argued
that at the lower speeds additional stimuli are required
which are obtained during the extended periods of
inattention to the task. [Ref 9, p 249]
Kochhar and Jaisingh offer this explanation of the decline in
inspector accuracy resulting from increased inspection time
available that was noted in their experiments:
Error detection in vigilance situations of this type is
dependent upon operator arousal levels. Thus the low
levels of fault information and product pacing did not
arouse the subject to the point where performance could
be optimal .... It could be inferred that operator
performance in inspection is related to arousal and in
evaluating trade-offs between the different variables due
consideration should be given to maintaining operator
arousal. [Ref 23, p. 44]
The phenomenon that more time beyond a certain critical point
does not yield more inspector accuracy is real. Analysts
cannot blindly assume that more inspector time will continue
to yield an improving probability for accuracy. To continue
to allot more inspector time is counterproductive. In
addition to an actual decrease in inspector accuracy, more
inspector time costs the facility either the salary of more
inspectors or reduced productivity due to a slowed production
line.
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4. Significance of Schoonard's Findings
Many visual inspection experiments have been
conducted. Few of those experimental findings have direct
application to the actual inspection operations on production
lines. Schoonard, Gould, and Miller explain the shortcomings
of the bulk of visual inspection experiments:
Fundamental laboratory studies. . . have limited application
to most actual inspection situations because they use
discrete targets on homogenous backgrounds, whereas most
inspection situations consist of poorly defined targets
on non-homogenous backgrounds. [Ref 24, p 365]
Another shortcoming of much experimental work is the
hiring of students to perform the simple visual inspection
tasks in the laboratory studies. The nature of most actual
inspection tasks is sufficiently technical to require
specially trained inspectors. The inspectors' frames of mind,
motivation, and dedication have much to do with how they will
perform when inspecting. The results will very likely differ
significantly between experiments where fully paid and trained
inspectors perform technical inspection tasks that they
perform everyday and other experiments where students are paid
some nominal fee to perform very simplistic visual inspection
tasks for a day. To extrapolate information from experimental
work for use in analysis of actual inspection work, the
experiment should closely resemble the actual inspection
situation in several key respects.
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5 . Estimating Time for Inspector to Inspect
An estimate on the standard time that it takes an
inspector to perform a visual inspection task is necessary to
establish the range of time over which an inspector can
productively be employed on a task. In regards to eliciting
estimates of times required to inspect for worker error the
NRC writes:
Estimation of performance times poses a more difficult
problem (than human error probabilities). The best
approach is to take measurements of actual or simulated
task times. A second-best approach is to combine
estimates of those who perform the tasks. [Ref 14, p. 6-
1]
Nothing precludes empirical measurement to derive the required
time estimates of visual inspection tasks except the cost and
difficulty of doing so. There may be several potential worker
errors within the visual scope of the inspector at any one
time. Measuring the time an inspector takes on any one visual
task is complicated by the difficulty of the experimenter
trying to track where the inspector's eyes are fixated. The
costs of empirical measurement of times for visual inspection
tasks is large due to the fact that each facility must likely
derive its own time estimates due to individual facility
peculiarities. Those peculiarities involve, for instance,
level of training of the inspectors, special equipment that
inspectors use, and standard operating procedures within the
facility.
37
An alternative to empirical observation to derive time
estimates on inspectors is a modification of the indirect
numerical estimation technique. The standard inspector time
on one task may be known through empirical observation. All
other tasks are compared to one another on a respondent survey
form. The respondents make directional judgments between




Which of the two visual inspection tasks requires more
time to accomplish?
2 About how much longer ( in terms of seconds ) does the
one task take to inspect compared to the other task?
Through simple algebraic manipulation estimates are derived
from the survey as to the amount of time taken to perform all
visual inspection tasks. This algebraic manipulation is given
with sample data in Appendix C. These point estimates are
averaged with the input of others from the same facility to
yield a facility-wide estimate of time for an inspector to
visually inspect every task.
D. THE COSTS OF ERROR
Many costs vie for the attention of the analyst and the
executive. Swain writes;
Most consideration must be given to those potential errors
with an intolerable combined possibility of occurring,
going undetected, and causing an unacceptable system
consequence. [Ref 10, p. 90]
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An error that causes unacceptable system consequence is an
error which is potentially too costly in terms of the
consequences of interest for the system. Swain writes of the
difference between errors that cause acceptable system
consequence and those that cause unacceptable system
consequence:
For some errors, the system consequences may not be severe
and perhaps a somewhat high possibility of an uncaught
error can be tolerated. Other potential errors might have
such severe consequences that uncaught error probabilities
of even one in a million could not be tolerated. For
example, a pharmaceutical company could probably not
tolerate the existence of one cyanide capsule in one
million multivitamin capsules delivered to the public.
[Ref 10, p. 89]
The analyst must develop ways to assess potential costs of
errors so that the manager can allocate error catching
resources with regard to the potentially most damaging errors.
The reallocation of error-catching resources in an
organization is a change in system design. It is important
to remember that in a systems approach:
...successful design changes may not always reduce the
probability of an error-but they will reduce the
probability of undesirable system effects due to such
errors. [Ref 10, p 90]
In the multivitamin example mentioned by Swain, a very
successful design change may be one that increases the
incidence of cracked capsules (a frequent error of small
costs) in bottles, but absolutely assures that a cyanide
capsule (a rare error of monumental costs) never shows up in
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a bottle of multivitamin capsules. It is essential that the
potential costs of errors be estimated before resources can
be allocated to reduce the probability of undesirable system
effects.
For any one type of error there is a corresponding
distribution of costs. The U.S. Army suggests a quick method
for establishing a cost distribution based on the Project
Evaluating and Review Technique (PERT):
One might well consider the possible use of subjective
cost estimates based on PERT...
Once it has been decided to employ the PERT technique
to determine likely costs, it becomes necessary to
estimate the most optimistic cost, the most pessimistic
cost, and the most likely cost...
These concepts fit in rather well with the idea of a
generalized Beta distribution. An adequate statistical
model of the Beta density to represent probable cost is:
(2-3) f(c) = k(c - A)P * (B-c)'^, A<<<B
where:
f(c) = probability density function of costs
c = cost
k = constant to make area under distribution curve
= 1
(2-4) k = 1 / [(B-A)P*''^^ * P(p-H,q+1)]
(3 = complete Beta function
A = minimum cost
B = maximum cost
p,q = parameters determining the shape of the beta
distribution [Ref 33, p. 36-6]
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From the PERT cost distribution a mean and standard deviation
can be easily computed.
(2-5) m = estimate of mean cost = (a + 4*m^ + b) / 6
(2-6) V = estimate of variance = (b - a)^ / 36
where:
a = estimate of minimum cost
b = estimate of maximum cost
m^ = estimate of most likely cost
[Ref 33, p. 36-7]
See Appendix B for more details of this procedure.
The PERT cost estimation technique requires expert opinion
to generate estimates for the cost distribution. Moder and
Phillips point to an immediate supervisor as one capable of
providing estimates for PERT:
The basis of PERT computations ... depends on the judgment
of the person in charge of the activity in question. He
is asked to call on his general experience, and his
knowledge of the requirements of the activity in question,
to consider the personnel and facilities available to him,
and then to estimate the three (costs): optimistic,
pessimistic, and most likely (costs). [Ref 34, p 204]
E. GOAL PROGRAMMING
1. Versatility and Utility
Goal programming is a powerful mathematical
programming technique which allows for models that very
closely approximate problems in industry, business, and
government. The power of goal programming is wrapped up in
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its ability to overcome human analytical weaknesses. Paulos
writes about one of those weaknesses:
There's a strong human tendency to want everything, and
to deny that trade-offs are usually necessary. . .Trade-offs
between. . .speed and thoroughness. . .are frequently muddled
and covered with a misty gauze, and this decline in
clarity is usually an added cost for everyone. [Ref 1
,
p. 131]
The decision maker can often visualize and announce what he
wants to accomplish in several competing areas. The level at
which the decision maker wants to achieve is a goal. The
several goals that a decision maker has are often very
different. Budnick, Mojena, and Vollman write of the power
of goal programming:
Goal programming. .. allows for consideration of multiple
goals. The goals may or may not be of the same dimension
or unit of measurement. In addition, goal programming
allows for consideration of conflicting goals. [Ref 6, p
352]
When it comes to giving something up for something
else the decision maker often balks. Bell, Keeney, and Raiffa
note the quandary in which the decision maker finds himself:
This is what the multi-objective problem is all about:
the making of vexing value trade-offs. There is no magic
formula for making these value trade-offs. The decision
maker would, of course, like to do the best he can in each
attribute, but it is not possible to maximize several
things at once. If we reduce unemployment, it may be at
the expense of increasing inflation. . . These problems are
pervasive and are at the heart of many public policy
controversies. [Ref 35, p. 4]
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Any method that helps coax the decision maker into making
tradeoffs is a help. Goal programming is a method for
attacking the multi-objective problem.
A decision variable is established which is the entity
over which the decision maker has some control or influence.
The decision variable is often a resource. The amount of the
resource that can be employed is limited by constraints on the
system. Through some known or hypothesized relationships
varying amounts of the decision variable effect the levels of
goal achievement. The relationships by which those decision
variables affect the decision maker's goals are captured by
mathematical models in the goal constraints. An achievement
function mathematically combines the deviations from all
goals. By minimizing or maximizing the achievement function
through linear or nonlinear programming methods a level of
resource (decision variable) use is determined such that the
goals are most closely achieved.
Goal programming calls for the satisfying of goals
rather than the maximization of some single objective, as is
often the case in standard linear programming. The decision
maker states his goals, ranks them as to their importance, and
weights them if necessary. The analyst determines the
relationships between a controllable variable and the
achievement of the goals. Goal programming gives the amount
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of the controllable variable to expend to accomplish as
closely as possible what the decision maker desires.
Budnick, Mojena, and Vollman explain the satisfying
of goals in this way:
With multiple goals, all goals usually cannot be realized
exactly. Goal programming attempts to minimize the
deviations from these goals with consideration given to
the hierarchy of stated priorities. [Ref 6, p 352]
Ignizio refers to the greater applicability of multi-objective
models to actual problems as a reason to pursue goal
programming. Hillier and Lieberman present a concise review
of goal programming [Ref 5, p 242-252].
2. Applied to Allocation of Inspection Time
The overall allocation of inspection resources problem
is one that is determined by executives in an organization.
Take, for instance, an organization making an investment
decision. A million dollar budget for quality assurance is
being allocated. The decision of going with twenty visual
inspectors or two visual inspectors and robotics is a decision
far removed from the floor manager. It is not commonly within
the manager's means to hire or fire inspectors or buy new
inspection-aiding equipment. The manager must take what the
organization provides him, whether it is two or twenty visual
inspectors, and make the facility work to achieve quality and
quantity standards. Basically, the only thing that the floor
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manager may directly control in regard to inspection of the
final product is the allocation of time that the inspector
spends per visual task.
a. Decision Variables
The decision variables in goal programming are the
variables over which the decision maker has some control and
which have some influence over the achievement of the goals.
In goal programming to achieve allocation of visual inspection
resources the inspector time spent on checking the work of
others is the decision variable ( X^, i= the number of visual
inspection tasks). The purpose of goal programming is to
determine an acceptable use of the decision variable.
b. System Constraints
A system is always limited in the amount of the
decision variable that can be employed. This limitation is
due to a limited supply of the resource or limited capacity
of the system to employ the resource. In goal programming to
allocate visual inspection time resources at least two system
constraints exist: the minimum and the maximum amounts of
time that can be spent productively on each of the inspection
tasks. These limits are based on the experimental findings
of Drury [Ref 26] and Schoonard, Gould, and Miller [Ref 24].
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c. Goal Constraints
Goals reflect the objectives of the decision
maker. With visual inspection there is usually a thoroughness
goal and a speed goal that the manager specifies. These goals
are elastic, allowing some deviation if insufficient resources
are available to satisfy both goals.
(2-7) Z Xi - TPOS + TNEG = TIMEGOAL
where m = the number of inspection tasks to be done.
The right hand side of this constraint represents a goal in
terms of time in which the manager wants inspections to be
completed. The deviation from the goal which matters to the
manager is captured by TPOS.
m
(2-8) Z [f(xj* C( error.) ] - ACCPOS + ACCNEG = ACCGOAL
i = l
where f(Xi) = probability of inspector error as a
function of time he spends on the
inspection task,
C(errori) = the cost of error^ in meters.
The right hand side of this constraint represents a goal in
terms of accuracy that the manager wants to be met. The
deviation from the goal which matters to the manager is
captured by ACCPOS. Deviations in one goal versus another are
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encouraged through weights that are applied to the respective
deviations in the achievement function.
The desires of the decision maker are often
preemptive: one tier of goals must be satisfied before
another tier can be considered. Hillier and Lieberman
describe preemptive goal programming and the handling of
goals:
Consider the case for preemptive goal programming. Such
a case arises when one or more of the goals clearly is far
more important than the others. Thus the initial focus
should be on achieving as closely as possible these first
priority goals. After we find an optimal solution with
respect to the first priority goals, we can break any ties
for the optimal solution by considering second priority
goals. When we deal with goals on the same priority
level, our approach is just like the one described for
nonpreemptive goal programming. [Ref 5, p. 245]
Assume a number of independent visual inspection
tasks which must be accomplished properly for an error-free
product to come out of the facility. Assume that a cost, a
quantitative measure relating to loss of customer
satisfaction, can be associated with each error on a product
that leaves the facility. If the manager can state a maximum
tolerance cost, within which the confidence of the consumer
is maintained, then the building of tiers can proceed in a
manner such as this:
TIER 1.
Any inspection task covering a worker error which has a
cost greater than the maximum tolerance cost should be
considered first to maintain the consumer's confidence.
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TIER 2.
If any time remains after the first tier inspection tasks
are allotted their time then that remaining time can be
applied to the second tier of goals. The second tier
consists of any visual inspection tasks not addressed in
tier one.
If there is insufficient time to cover all tasks
in the first tier, then goal programming is invoked to
determine the allocation of time across those first tier
visual inspection tasks. If sufficient time exists for the
first tier tasks to receive maximum time then they are given
their full allotment of time and goal programming is invoked
to allocate time on the visual tasks in the second tier.
d. Achievement Function
The achievement function takes the goals within
one tier of the goal program and considers the deviations from
each goal simultaneously. The deviations from goals are given
weights by the decision maker in accordance with their
relative importance to the organization.
In the goal program for allocating visual
inspection resources, the decision maker gives a weight to the
time goal deviation and the accuracy goal deviation. The
appropriate weight is multiplied by the deviation variable for
each goal. The two weighted values are then summed to equal
a total deviation for the problem. The achievement function
minimizes this total deviation value. As the goal program
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iterates, it trades off accuracy for time or time for accuracy
until a solution is reached which best satisfies the two goals
in light of their respective weights.
The standard achievement function for allocating
visual inspection time is given in Equation 2-9.
(2-9) Minimize DEVIATION
where DEVIATION = (TIMEWT * TPOS ) + (ACCWT * ACCPOS
)
e. The Formulation
The generic goal program to accomplish allocation
of inspection time is shown in Figure 5.
Achievement Function
Minimize:
DEVIATION = (TIMEWT * TPOS) + (ACCWT * ACCPOS).
Goal Constraints
Subject to:
:: Xi - TPOS + TNEG = TIMEGOAL
i = l
r [ f(xj * C( error. ) ] - ACCPOS + ACCNEG = ACCGOAL
i = l
where m = the number of inspection tasks to be done.
System Constraints
Tmini < Xi < T^^i , for i = 1 , 2 , m
Xi, ..., X„, TPOS, TNEG, ACCPOS, ACCNEG ^ 0.
Figure 5 - Goal Program Formulation
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F. SOFTWARE SUPPORT OF METHODOLOGY
Suggested software support of the proposed methodology
includes computer packages that swiftly perform a number of
matrix operations and optimization.
1. Matrix Operations
A means to manage matrix operations is needed to
transform the survey responses on worker error into useable
data for the model. Some survey responses will be invalid due
to internal inconsistencies. As discussed in Chapter II, B-
4, eigenvalues are needed to determine the internal
consistency in a group of judgments from a respondent. An
eigenvalue solver or software which will allow the analyst to
manipulate matrices to derive eigenvalues is necessary to
permit a timely decision of whether to incorporate various
respondent surveys into the model.
A Programming Language (commonly known as APL ) is a
software product that permits easy manipulation of matrices.
The eigenvalue solver that accompanies most APL software
packages is used on the illustrative problem of this thesis.
APL is used in both Appendix A and Appendix D to derive the
eigenvector from respondent surveys for the probabilities of
crew error and to derive the maximum eigenvalue to determine
respondent consistency.
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2. An Optimizing Package
A linear or nonlinear programming package is needed
to optimize the objective function. There are 13 decision
variables that simultaneously need to be considered.
a. Nonlinear Programming Package
A nonlinear programming package will permit a
straight-forward solution to the model. Data which show the
increase in inspector accuracy as a function of time is
extracted from experimental studies which closely approximates
the type of visual task being modeled. A curve fit is made
to that data and a function is generated that approximates the
curve fit. That function, if convex, can be included directly
into the goal constraints for use by goal programming. The
curves in all studies indicated in this thesis have indeed
been convex.
In the illustrative problem which accompanies this
thesis the versatile and powerful Generalized Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) package is used. GAMS allows for
nonlinear programming. An example of the input and output
which is produced with GAMS is shown in Appendix E.
b. Linear Programming Package
A linear programming package will permit a
solution to the model. There is a minor degree of difficulty
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in that the continuous curve generated by the curve fit in
nonlinear programming must be broken up and made piecewise
linear so that a linear programming package can solve the
problem.
The remainder of this thesis is the presentation
of a problem to illustrate the methodology of allocating
visual inspection resources in a production facility suggested
in Chapter 2.
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III. BACKGROUND TO AN ARTILLERY PROBLEM
A. THE ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION
The artillery fire support system consists of separate
components which contribute to the goals of "rapid and
accurate" fires. Depicted in Figure 6 are the components of
the artillery system.
OBSERVER FIRE DIRECTION CENTER
FIRING UNIT
Figure 6 - The Sub-system Components of the Artillery
The observer, a Forward Observer ( FO ) or a RADAR section,
spots a target. The Fire Direction Center ( FDC ) receives the
target location information from the observer and translates
that input into orienting data for the guns. The gun section
prepares the ammunition, orients the weapon, and fires at the
observer's target. Survey sections and meteorology sections
support the gun section by giving topological surveyed grid
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control and atmospheric meteorological information input into
the system.
The system components noted above are grouped into
artillery organizations. Several gun sections and one FDC
constitute a battery of artillery, commanded by a captain.
Several batteries of artillery, observers, and surveyors are
organized into a battalion of artillery, commanded by a
lieutenant colonel. Several battalions and meteorologists
compose a brigade of artillery, commanded by a colonel.
B. ROLES OF THE PLAYERS.
The focus of this thesis is the Gun Section. The Gun
Section consists of the members depicted in Table 1.
TABLE 1. MEMBERS OF A GUN SECTION
position rank number yrs in
service
Chief E-6 1 5-15
Gunner E-5 1 2-10
Asst gunner E-4 1 1-8
Ammo handlers E-1,4 3-7 0-8
The ammunition handlers prepare the shell that carries the
munitions to the target, set the fuze that activates the shell
at the appropriate point in its trajectory, and select the
propellant charge that propels the shell out of the cannon and
towards the target with the proper velocity. The assistant
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gunner vertically orients the weapon tube to a designated
position so as to obtain the trajectory needed to reach the
range of the target. The gunner horizontally orients the
weapon to a designated position to place the weapon tube on
line with the target. The chief inspects the work of his
subordinates to insure accuracy of settings and then commands
the crew to fire the weapon.
The FDC computes six elements of data that, when taken
together, constitute the weapon aimpoint. Those six elements
of data are the horizontal orientation setting, vertical
orientation setting, shell type, fuze type, fuze setting, and
amount of propellant. Firing the weapon at an aimpoint other
than that directed by FDC is a gun crew error and is the
responsibility of the chief.
C. POSSIBLE ERRORS THAT A GUN CREW MAKES
The four errors associated with the ammunition handlers
are
:
1) improperly selecting the shell type,
2) improperly selecting the fuze type,
3) improper setting of the fuze, and
4) improperly cutting the amount of propellant.
The four errors associated with the assistant gunner and the
vertical orientation of the weapon are:
1) improperly setting the pre-designated four digit
elevation number on the elevation counter,
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2) improperly leveling the pitch bubble,
3) improperly leveling the cross level bubble, and
4) failing to have the proper two digit number in the
piece correction window.
Figure 7 shows the location of these four errors on the
assistant gunner's mount of a towed howitzer. The four errors




improperly setting the pre-designated four digit
number on the deflection counter,
2) improperly leveling the sight mount bubbles,
3) failing to have the proper two digit number in the
piece correction window, and
4 not traversing the weapon to acquire a proper
sight picture through the panoramic telescope onto
the aiming reference point.
Figure 7 shows the location of these four errors on the
gunner's mount of a towed howitzer.
In addition to the above twelve errors that a chief must
check prior to firing his weapon, there are checks he must
make regarding the firing data his crew receives from the FDC.
VJhen firing into a clearly defined area for a prolonged period
of time a chief is given a schematic that depicts the limits
of the area into which he can safely fire. The schematic that
depicts the limits for the safe fire of a weapon is called a
"safety T". The chief is required to check that the -settings
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Figure 7 - Potential Gunner and Assistant Gunner Errors
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being made by his crew are within the horizontal orientation
limits, vertical orientation limits, fuze setting limits,
propellant limits, and ammunition constraints imposed by the
schematic. In this way the chief insures that crewmen have
not set grossly inaccurate data due to garbled communication
from the FDC or from fellow crew members. As a minimum, the
chief insures by means of the "safety T" that the round his
section fires will fall within the limits of safe fire for
munitions impact.
D. THE GUN CHIEF'S TIME ALLOCATION PROBLEM
The artillery's primary mission is to support the ground
gaining maneuver forces with firepower to destroy the enemy
or diminish his will to fight. The artillery accomplishes
this mission by providing fast and accurate fires when called
upon to do so [Ref.43 p. 13]. Each component of the artillery
fire support system is called on to contribute to the twin
goals of fast and accurate fire.
General Otis states, "(Artillery is) a widespread organism
whose ultimate function is to deliver massive firepower
exactly when and where the force commander wants it [Ref 30,
p 29]." Fast and accurate artillery fire is what the maneuver
force demands and what the artillery force must deliver. This
thesis recognizes fast and accurate artillery fires as the
preeminent consequences of interest (or measures of
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effectiveness) for the entire artillery system. The final
component, the gun section, shoots the projectile at the
target. The crew of men that operate the gun is the focus of
the illustrative problem of this thesis.
The primary resources available during fire missions that
directly influence gun crew firing accuracy are the gun
chiefs. The commander employs the gun chiefs as his personal
quality assurance inspectors [Ref 31, p. 3-5]. These personnel
effect accuracy by inspecting for gun crew errors prior to the
firing of each round. There are sixteen distinct, mutually
exclusive errors noted previously that the crew can make when
firing the weapon. The limited resource that the inspector
expends to influence accuracy is the time that he takes to
inspect for errors. The inspector's time is limited because
artillery fires must not only be accurate, but fast.
Excessive time by the inspector detracts from promptness of
fires
.
Current U.S. Army literature does not specify a method by
which an inspector is to allocate his pre-fire inspection
time. It is expected that a gun chief will use his artillery
experience, knowledge of his crew, and intuition to decide
where his time will best be spent between the various error-
prone tasks he must cover. Intuition is inadequate in complex
decision making, and this problem requires a complex decision
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[Ref 3, p. 17]. Systems analysis and logic dictate the
spending of limited error-stopping resources commensurate with
the importance of the error.
This illustrative problem presents an allocation of
inspection time model for use by a commander. The model
quickly and efficiently analyzes the importance of gun crew
errors for an artillery unit by using subjective input from
unit leaders garnered by means of surveys. The model then
uses goal programming and suggests an allocation of pre-fire
inspection time to reduce the probability of undesirable
consequences due to errors.
The alternative to allocation of resources by modeling is
strict intuition. If intuition is failing in a unit as an
effective means of allocating time then modeling offers an
alternative. The alternative to modeling by means other than
the quick techniques of the methodology in this thesis is to
model using input from empirical observations. The use of
empirical observations to generate error data is not viable.
The error data needed are functions of training,
experience, readiness, and type of cannon weapon system in the
unit. These factors vary considerably between units.
Consequently, information gleaned in one unit will have little
use in another unit. The first three factors; training,
experience, and readiness; can change considerably within the
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same unit in a matter of weeks. Therefore, information
gleaned in a unit may have little use in the same unit the
following month. Gathering of unit error data through
empirical observation for every artillery unit at frequent
intervals is impractical, if not impossible. The modeling
methodology must be as efficient as the situation is dynamic.
The methodology presented in this thesis is useable by
artillery units to allocate inspection time.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions in this problem are in two categories. One
set of assumptions isolates the effects of errors by the crew
so that other off-setting or magnifying errors do not
interfere with the analysis of the crew. The second set of
assumptions facilitates modeling.
1. Assumptions to Isolate the Problem
The concern of this illustrative problem is the
difference between the FDC's aimpoint (the target location)
and the gun section's aimpoint (the expected location of shell
impact). That difference is the net effect of the error that
the gun crew makes and the chief fails to catch. This error
is measurable in terms of the number of meters by which the
shell is expected to miss the target.
To isolate the gun section regarding its contribution
to fast and accurate artillery fire, it is necessary to make
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some assumptions. For the purpose of this thesis the
following simplifying assumptions regarding source of firing
errors are made
.
a. The other artillery system components (besides the
gun section) perform their respective tasks
related to timely fire in the time that is
expected of them.
b. The aimpoint computed by FDC is the actual
location of the target.
1
)
No errors are made among the other
artillery system components (FO, RADAR,
FDC, Survey, Meteorology).
2 The gun crews do not err when taking
measurements for the FDC. Gun crews are
periodically asked by the FDC to provide
propellant temperatures and muzzle
velocities to assist in a better computer
solution.
c. The aimpoint of the weapon is the precise impact
point of the shell.
1) Dispersion is disregarded. Artillery
fire always experiences normal dispersion
in terms of range probable error and




No errors are made by the battery
leadership during the emplacement of the
cannon weapon system. Prior to being set
up to fire, the unit leadership emplaces
the weapons. Errors occur during this
emplacement which, if not corrected, will
affect the accuracy of the artillery to
follow.
3 No errors are made when the gun crew
performs routine serviceability checks of
their weapon. Prior to weapon firing the .
gun section performs tasks which can
later affect accuracy. These tasks deal
with such things as sight alignment,
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checks to ensure equipment is within
tolerance, and emplacement of aiming
reference points.
4) No errors occur in sub-systems directly
related to the gun section. Events
external to the gun crew which may
negatively affect the accuracy of the
artillery are defective fuzes, defective
propellant, a round that fails to seat in
the chamber when it is rammed, and an
aiming reference point that is
inadvertently moved.
2. Assumptions to Facilitate Modeling
a. Battery Homogeneity
Gun sections are organized in batteries which
train together and achieve some degree of homogeneity under
their common commander. Among the duties of the commander is
the establishing of training standards, standard operating
procedures, and proficiency standards for the unit. It can
be reasonably expected that standards are somewhat uniform
across a battery. This uniformity allows for the gathering
of unit data rather than individual section data. Within the
unit, use of time and human error rates are basically
homogenous. Because of battery homogeneity, data generated
in one battery is of limited or no use in another battery.
b. Competent Gun Chiefs
A chief is capable. He is competent as a quality
assurance inspector of his crew's work. Gun chiefs are
required to go through thorough periodic testing to insure
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their aptitude at finding all possible crew errors. It is
assumed that a chief does not lose his ability to find
errors. The chief's competence is such that he perceives his
visual tasks as being relatively simple. Inspection failures
are the result of random error, not incompetence.
c. Gun Crew Errors are Independent of Each Other
Crew errors are not totally independent. A
poorly performing crewman is more likely to set a second
error than a superb soldier is of setting his first. The
interaction between errors is complex and unpredictable. It
would be extremely difficult to model that interaction. The
assumption of error independence is a rough approximation of
reality to facilitate modeling.
d. Type I versus Type II Error
If the costs of identifying a good product as
flawed (Type II error) is minimal compared to the costs of
failing to identify a flawed product as flawed (Type I error)
then Type II errors can be disregarded with little loss in
model validity. This allows for simplification of the model
and, in fact, is often the case in quality assurance
inspection work. In the artillery gun section Type II error
is commonly considered insignificant when compared to Type I
error. No chief has ever been ruined by being overcautious
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and calling a mission flawed when it was not. Many a chief
has been ruined by failing to catch a flawed mission.
e. Simplicity of Visual Inspection Tasks
The visual inspection tasks required on a gun
section are relatively simple to a trained cannoneer. The
types of errors to be identified do not require a detailed
search, exceptional visual acuity, or higher level cognitive
skills.
f. Effects of Errors are Cumulative
The errors a gun section makes can often off-set
each other such that the full effect of an error is not
realized. This model assumes that when multiple errors occur
on the same mission that their effects are cumulative along
one dimension. Therefore, this is a "worst-case" analysis
type model.
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IV. MODELING THE ARTILLERY PROBLEM
A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL
The model to allocate a gun chief's inspection time is a
goal program which suggests an amount of time a gun chief
should spend on each of thirteen inspection tasks prior to
every round fired from his weapon. The suggestion for time
use is based on the following criteria for the tasks:
1) The likelihood of crew error;
2) The likelihood of inspector error;
3) The potential costs of the fired error;
4) The commanders' objectives.
The method by which the data are gathered for the model takes
into account the characteristics of the artillery weapon
system and the level of training of the surveyed unit being
analyzed.
B. THE PROBABILITY OF GUN CREW ERROR
Each of the 16 crew tasks which the chief inspects with
his 13 visual inspection tasks has a distinct probability for
error. Based on the battery homogeneity assumption, a
probability for crew error applies across all the gun
sections of a battery. As a result of his firsthand
knowledge of the phenomenon, the gun chief has a strong
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intuitive sense for the relative frequency of errors on the
crew tasks that he inspects.
Due to the battery homogeneity assumption and the fact
that there are six or eight gun sections to a battery, there
are seldom more than eight gun chiefs to give expert judgment
on any crew error phenomenon under investigation. The paired
comparison technique of estimating error is not viable unless
there is a large number of respondents. Thus, the paired
comparison technique is not a practical solution for the
illustrative problem in this thesis.
The model accepts the gun chief as an expert capable of
rendering judgments on relative frequencies of crew errors.
The model gathers this individual knowledge by means of a
survey. Appendix G contains copies of the surveys
administered to the gun chiefs. The survey forces the chief
to make enough comparisons to allow for an internal
consistency check on his judgments (Saaty [Ref 17]). Those
judgments found to be sufficiently consistent are converted
to probabilities using the indirect numerical estimation
technique (Swain and Miller [Ref 1]) and averaged together
(Von Winterfeldt [Ref 29]). The result is a deterministic
point estimate of probability for each crew error in the
battery. Appendix G shows the structure of the survey.
Appendix C demonstrates checking the consistency of
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individual surveys. Appendix A gives an example of
converting paired comparison survey input into probabilities
and the averaging of input from several experts.
C. THE PROBABILITY OF INSPECTOR ERROR
With 13 inspection tasks the gun chief checks the 16
possible crew errors. Four of the crew errors, the four
associated with the assistant gunner, are assessed by a
single check that a chief makes using a precision tool called
a gunner's quadrant. Within certain bounds inspector error
is a function of time taken to inspect a crew task. Those
bounds for a gun section are explored.
1. A Function of Time
For a fraction of a second at the start of an
inspection task the inspector experiences no increase in
accuracy performance due to time required for eyes to focus
and the starting of the visual search. As the inspector
takes more time his probability for successfully identifying
an error, given that an error exists, increases at a
decreasing rate (Rizzi, Buck, Anderson [Ref 25]). This
increase in accuracy performance continues until the
inspector spends 1 . 5 times the standard amount of time he
would normally spend on that visual task (Schoonard, Gould,
Miller [Ref 24] ) .
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The experimental findings of Schoonard, Gould, and
Miller are heavily incorporated to establish an upper bound
for the productive use of time for a gun chief performing
visual inspection tasks. Schoonard, Gould, and Miller's
study [Ref 24] closely approximates the situation in which
gun chiefs find themselves when inspecting for crew error.
The study picked a technical task, the inspection of
integrated silicon circuit chips, requiring trained
inspectors. Each inspector had a minimum of six months
experience inspecting for faulty chips. The actual visual
search required the simultaneous searching for six or more
different types of errors followed by a decision to accept or
not accept the chip construction. The possible errors ranged
from the simple to the complex in terms of the difficulty of
discerning them during an inspection. The range of times
that inspectors took to inspect a specific chip for errors
was 2.7 to 5.4 seconds. In every aspect of the study noted
above, Schoonard, Gould, and Miller come extremely close to
the situation of a gun chief inspecting for a gun crew error.
The model accepts that from the time the chief starts
searching for errors until 1.5 times the standard time spent
on that inspection task [Ref 24] the chief experiences an
exponentially increasing probability of detecting an error
[Ref 25]. At 1.5 times the standard time spent on an
inspection task a competent chief, with no distracting
factors, detects 100% of errors (Drury [Ref 26]). If given
more than 1 . 5 times the standard time for inspection the
inspector experiences degradation in his performance (Kochhar
[Ref 23] ).
Drury [Ref 26] and Smith and Barany [Ref 22 and 32]
both develop a curve which represents the inspector's
probability for accurate inspection results as a function of
time. The curve increases at a decreasing rate, forming a
gentle, convex curve. The curve is continuous from a minimum
time which reflects the time it takes the eye and brain to
start a visual search to a maximum time which reflects the
limits of human vigilance for simple inspection tasks. The
maximum time is assumed to be 1.5 times the standard time
spent by the inspector on the task. The function chosen to
represent the probability for inspector accuracy curve is:
(4-1) Yi = /( T, ) , i = 1, 13
Where Y^= probability for inspector accuracy on task i
"^i" ( "^I ~ '^MINi ) / ( '^MAXi ~ "^MINi )
Tj= time chosen to spend on task^
This curve approximates the curves that Drury [Ref 26, p 264]
and Smith and Barany [Ref 32, p 5] found in their work and
which are depicted in Chapter II. C.
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2. Establishing Standard Time Use on Visual Inspection
Tasks
To utilize the experimental findings that greatest
inspector accuracy is achieved at 1.5 times the standard
amount of time spent on a visual inspection task requires the
generation of standard inspection times on all visual tasks.
The standard time used to perform each visual inspection task
could be gathered by empirical observation, but this
illustrative problem uses the alternative of gathering the
chief's knowledge of time utilization by means of a survey
[Ref 14, p. 6-1] .
The chief has a strong sense for where his time is
spent when he inspects for error. The chief performs paired
comparisons of the amount of time spent on various inspection
tasks. From the paired comparison data the model derives a
point estimate for the time spent per inspection task by the
gun chief. By averaging across all chiefs in a battery the
model derives a battery estimate for chief's time spent per
inspection task. See Appendix C for details on the
structuring of a time use survey and of how a time use
estimate is derived from actual data.
3. Total Time to Perform All Inspection Tasks
A limit on the total amount of time an inspector is
permitted to perform all visual tasks may be determined by a
commander. For general purposes of this problem, the Field
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Artillery School standard of 30 seconds is the amount of time
permitted chiefs to inspect their crews prior to fire [Ref
39, p. 3].
D. THE PROBABILITY OF FIRING AN ERROR
For an error to be fired the chief must be inspecting an
improperly performed task and fail to identify the error.
The probability that the crew performed a given task
improperly is a point estimate derived by survey input. The
probability that the chief fails to identify the error is a
function of time. The model is shown in Figure 8.
A technique in nonlinear programming for evaluating the
curve in Figure 8 is shown in Equation 4-2. This technique
explicitly models the curve shape shown in Figure 8.
(4-2) P,,,ci = [ v^d - Pc.)' * Ti + Pc, ], i = l,2 13;
where T^= ( T^ - T^jni ) / ( T„Axi " T„iNi ) ^ see Equation (4-1);
Pii*ci ~ P(accuracyi) = probability for system accuracy
on task^,
P(errori) = 1 - P(accuracyi) = probability for system
error on task^.
E. THE COST OF FIRING AN ERROR
The costs for firing an artillery gun crew error range
from the insignificant or the unnoticeable to the very
significant. Some of the more important costs of a gun crew
error being fired are:
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1)
loss of maneuver force confidence in their
supporting artillery;
2) the cost of the resupply effort to deliver more
ammunition for that which was wasted;
3) loss of destructiveness due to inaccuracy.
The most important costs are directly related to the
consequences of interest for the system. Timeliness and
accuracy of fire are the consequences of interest to the
artillery fire support system.
Each of the 16 crew tasks has a different cost
distribution associated with it in terms of inaccuracy (in
meters), should the crewman err at performing his task. The
model uses the PERT cost estimation technique to determine a
cost distribution for each error [Ref 33] . Senior battery
personnel that are well versed in both fire direction and gun
crew operations determine the largest, the smallest, and the
most likely error of each of the 16 error types. Using
tabular firing tables [Ref 38] for the battery's weapon system
and assuming a range at which targets are most likely engaged,
a Beta distribution cost curve (in meters) is established for
each error type [Ref 38 and Ref 33] . See Appendix B for
details of the PERT cost estimation technique.
The potential number of meters by which a crew error
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Figure 8 - Probability of Firing an Error
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either the amount of damage that can be expected on the target
(small errors) or the amount of maneuver confidence that may
be lost (large errors).
F. MULTI-OBJECTIVE CRITERION OF THE COMMANDER
The commander has objectives that he wants accomplished.
Suppose, for instance, that a given commander, first and
foremost, wants never to lose the confidence of the maneuver
force he supports. Second, the commander wants to have
effects on target. These hypothetical but realistic
objectives of a commander are pursued in the remainder of this
model to demonstrate the flexibility and real-world
applicability of goal programming.
1. Making a Goal out of First Objective
For the purpose of this problem, assume that the loss
of maneuver confidence in their supporting artillery is the
most costly and damaging thing that can happen to the fire
support system. There is good reason that this may well be
true for any artillery unit. Loss of confidence results in
hesitance on the part of maneuver to employ artillery and thus
increases the chances of losing combat engagements due to lack
of firepower.
Confidence is difficult to quantify and place on some
continuous scale. Therefore, a crew error cannot be directly
linked to an amount of confidence lost by the maneuver force
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towards its supporting artillery. It is intuitive that a miss
by a large number of meters corresponds to a larger loss of
confidence by the maneuver whereas a small miss may be
mistaken as normal dispersion and thus goes unnoticed.
Therefore potential number of meters by which a crew error
causes the round to miss a target suffices as a surrogate for
the amount of confidence lost.
Below a certain distance threshold, maneuver
confidence is not lost by artillery which misses its target.
Artillery is an area fire weapon and it is expected by those
who employ it that artillery will hit in the general vicinity
for which it was called. Within that vicinity, or expected
area of impact, the cost of crew error is just the cost of
missing the target and the cost of wasted ammunition.
The maneuver confidence radius represents the maximum
distance from the target that a round can hit and still
maintain the confidence of the maneuver force being supported.
The commander's first goal is that his rounds must hit within
the maneuver confidence radius of the targeted aimpoint. The
commander needs to specify a maneuver confidence radius.
2. Making a Goal out of the Second Objective
The commander's second objective, getting effects on
target, is clearly a function of both the accuracy of the fire
and the timeliness of the fire. If accuracy is sought at the
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excessive expense of time then the target will likely move and
escape destruction. If timeliness is sought at the excessive
expense of accuracy then the target will escape destruction
due to rounds missing the aimpoint. A trade-off between time
and accuracy is required to get effects on the target. The
commander needs to specify the accuracy and timeliness goals.
G. GOAL PROGRAM FORMULATION
In the proposed multi-objective problem there are two
objectives: avoid any loss of maneuver confidence and get
effects on target. One goal is on the first tier: hit within
the maneuver confidence radius of the target. Associated with
the second objective is a tier of goals. On the second tier
is an accuracy goal and a timeliness goal that the commander
specifies based on his weapon system and the targets on which
his weapon systems will most likely be employed.
This two-tiered set of goals lends itself to multi-
objective, preemptive goal programming. On the first tier is
the commander's goal of keeping maneuver confidence. Once
inspector time is allotted and this first goal is achieved
then the second tier of goals is considered.
1. Decision Variables
In goal programming to achieve allocation of visual
inspection resources, inspector time spent on checking the
work of others is the decision variable ( X^, i=the number of
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visual inspection tasks ) . The purpose of this goal
programming is to achieve a most satisfactory allocation of
inspector time.
2. System Constraints
The minimum and the maximum amounts of time that can
be spent productively on each of the tasks are the two system
constraints. These limits are based on the experimental
findings of Drury [Ref 25] and Schoonard, Gould, and Miller
[Ref 24] . Drury found a minimum amount of time required for
an inspector's eyes, brain, and nervous system to function and
start a visual search for error. Schoonard, Gould, and Miller
found a maximum amount of time that an inspector spends at a
visual inspection task before performance declines due to the
limits of human vigilance.
3. Goal Constraints
There is not a single deterministic cost associated
with each system error. There are three costs: a maximum, a
minimum, and a most likely cost. Using the PERT cost
estimation technique a Beta distribution curve is generated
to fit these costs. Visual inspection tasks are related to
accuracy goals through their individual beta cost functions.
Visual inspection tasks fall into consideration in
tier one if their minimum possible cost exceeds the maneuver
confidence radius. Visual tasks fall into consideration in
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tier two if their maximum possible cost exceeds the maneuver
confidence radius. Tier three visual tasks have maximum
possible costs below the maneuver confidence radius.
Time is allotted by tier, thus reflecting the
commander's priorities. The total amount of time required to
fully satisfy (1.5 times the standard time) all visual tasks
residing in a tier is compared to the total inspector time
available. If time required is less than time available then
all visual tasks in the tier are allotted a full complement
of time and the model moves to the next tier of tasks. If
time required to fully satisfy all visual tasks in a tier is
greater than the time available then the goal program is run
to determine allocation of inspection time among the visual
tasks residing in the tier.
Tasks within tiers are handled with the same goal
constraints. These goal constraints are elastic, allowing
some deviation if insufficient resources are available to
satisfy all goals.
The goal constraints are:
(4-3)
tier 1 Z X„ - TPOS + TNEG = TIMEGOAL,
n=l
for all tasks n where minimum cost task^ > MCR,
tier 2 Z X^ - TPOS + TNEG = TIMEGOAL2
p=i
7^
for all remaining tasks (13 - N) where maximum cost of
taskp > MCR,
tier 3 £ X„ - TPOS + TNEG = TIMEGOAL3
for all remaining tasks where (N + P + Q) =13.
TIMEGOALi is the overall goal for time in which all tasks are
to be completed. TIMEGOAL2 is the amount of time remaining
from TIMEGOALj^ after the first tier tasks are satisfied.
TIMEGOAL3 is the amount of time remaining from TIMEGOAL^^ after
the first and second tier tasks are satisfied.
(4-4)
tier 1 Z[P(error„) * MAXCOST^] - ACCPOS + ACCNEG =
n = l
for all tasks n where minimum cost task^, > MCR,
tier 2 i:[P(error„) * MAXCOST^] - ACCPOS + ACCNEG =
for all remaining tasks (13 - N) where maximum cost of
taskj, > MCR,
tier 3 f;[P(errorQ) * MEANCOST_] - ACCPOS + ACCNEG =
for all remaining tasks where (N + P + Q) = 13,
where P(errori) = the probability of system error on task^
from Equation 4-2,
MAXCOST^ = maximum cost of task^ (see Appendix B),
MEANCOST^ = mean cost of task^ (see Appendix B).
MCR = maneuver confidence values
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The right hand side of the constraint represents a goal in
terms of accuracy ( in meters ) that the commander wants to be
met.
4 . Achievement Function
The commander assigns a weight to the time goal
deviation and the accuracy goal deviation in the model. The
commander must weight the deviations from each goal with
respect to their relative importance to the fire support
system. The purpose of the goal program is to simultaneously
minimize deviations from goals within tiers.
The commander is generally aware of the type of combat
in which he will be employed and the type of targets on which
he will be called to deliver his fires. Most targets of
opportunity have the potential to move at some rate. That
rate (meters per second) provides the commander the knowledge
he needs to make a trade-off between timeliness of fire and
accuracy of fire. The commander expresses this trade-off by
the weight he assigns to the respective goal deviations.
The appropriate weight is multiplied times the
deviation variable for each goal. The two weighted values are
then summed to equal a total deviation for the problem. The
achievement function minimizes this total deviation value.
As the goal program iterates, it trades off accuracy for time
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or time for accuracy until a solution is reached which best
satisfies the two goals in light of their respective weights.
The achievement function is given in Equation 4-5.
(4-5)
Minimize:
DEVIATION = (TIMEWT * TPOS ) + (ACCWT * ACCPOS )
.
V. APPLICATION TO ACTIVE ARMY UNIT
A. CURRENT ALLOCATION OF INSPECTOR TIME
The competent chief will attempt to at least look at every
one of the 16 error-prone tasks accomplished by his crew. The
chief's underlying belief is that he is a good inspector and
that if he looks at the possible error he will likely catch
the error if it is present.
The following are the keys to modeling the current
allocation of chief's time on the pre-fire inspection:
1) The gun chief spends at least the theoretically




The gun chief spends additional time on those
tasks that he knows are more frequently in error
than others in the attempt to catch as many errors
as he can.
3) The chief does not trade time for accuracy. He
shoots within the time required of him ( 30
seconds) and checks as best he can (using rule 1
and 2) during that period of time.
The model proposed is simple, yet it mirrors the chief's
decision making process quite well. The idea behind the
current use of inspector time is summed up by the one goal
:
stop all errors within the time constraint to shoot. A GAMS
program which reflects these priorities and uses the
probabilities for error developed in this thesis is shown in
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Appendix E. The allotment of inspector time resulting from
this model is shown in TABLE 2.
B. ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION OF INSPECTOR TIME
The following are the keys to modeling the alternative
allocation of chief's time on the pre-fire inspection;
1
)
Visual inspection tasks covering crew errors with
minimum possible costs that exceed the maneuver
confidence radius must be considered first for
allocation of inspection time. The maximum
possible costs of the errors are considered when
the allocation of time is made.
2) Visual inspection tasks covering crew errors with
maximum possible costs that exceed the maneuver
confidence radius are considered next for
allocation of inspection time. The maximum costs
of the second tier errors are considered when the
allocation is made.
3) Visual inspection tasks covering the remaining
errors are considered last for allocation of
inspection time. The expected costs of the third
tier errors are considered when the allocation is
made.
The alternative model incorporates this information before
allocating inspector time. In this example of an alternative
plan for the use of the inspector's time the commander's goal
is to stop costly errors. The value that drives the goal, in
this instance, is maneuver force confidence and target
destruction. The results will be different than the current
allocation of inspector time which was driven by the
inspector's goal of stopping all errors.
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Appendix E gives the GAMS computer runs of both the
current and alternative allocation of inspection time by an
active army unit surveyed at Fort Ord, California. TABLE 2
shows the different allotments of inspector time per
inspection task that resulted from the two model runs.
TABLE 2. CURRENT VS ALTERNATIVE ALLOTMENT OF INSPECTOR TIME
Inspector Task Current Alternative Difference
Allotment Allotment Col2 - Coll
Gl 2.24 2.80 + .56
G2 2.56 1.05 - 1.51
G3 1.00 1.00
G4 1.60 1.46 - .14
AG 7.21 8.90 + 1.69
Al 1.80 1.80
A2 1.78 .75 - 1.03
A3 1.70 1.27 - .43
A4 3.40 3.40
51 1.14 3.00 + 1.86
52 2.00 2.00
53 2.15 3.50 + 1.35
54 1.40 1.23 - .17
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Visual inspection to identify worker error often involves
trained inspectors to perform a task requiring technical
expertise. Human accuracy at visual inspection tasks is
generally a function of the time taken to inspect. Inspector
accuracy at positively identifying existing errors increases
at a decreasing rate as a function of time. There are lower
and upper bounds on the time axis creating a range of time
over which this increasing inspector accuracy is a continuous
variable. Those bounds have been explored experimentally and
are available for use by systems analysts.
If the possible human errors on a work site can be
identified then expert judgments of the personnel involved in
the actual operational work can be used to derive the
probability for worker error on each task. In the same way,
the standard time an inspector spends on the inspection of the
task can be derived. Costs of system failures resulting from
task error can be estimated by the management.
The expected cost of doing business can be written as a
function of inspector time spent on each component task in the
system. If the decision maker can establish goals for the
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system cost of a product and the acceptable amount of time for
an inspector to spend on the product, then goal programming
provides a method for the organization to optimize the use of
inspector time.
B. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF METHODOLOGY
Small-scale operations that employ visual inspectors to
check the work of production personnel are prime candidates
for use of this methodology. The small-scale operation is
emphasized because it is most likely one in which a formal
system analysis has not been conducted to evaluate optimum
times for visual inspection or optimal rates by which
production must occur.
An abbreviated but effective systems analysis approach to
the proper utilization of inspector time requires only a few
probability estimations and a few cost estimations. The fact
that the personnel on the weapon systems can provide the
probability of error information and the unit leaders can
provide the cost of error information means that individual
units can apply systems analysis to better achieve their
goals.
The pace at which the product is presented to the visual
inspector has everything to do with whether the visual
inspection will have the desired effect of the management or
not. In this case a little bit of math goes a long way. By
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using eigenvalues to establish validity of expert judgments,
the model considers only those respondents whose judgments are
consistent. Some adding, multiplying, and dividing achieves
probabilities for each crew error. The cost estimation
technique uses a simple beta distribution to model the cost
distribution for each error. The model requires only three
rough estimates on the part of a knowledgeable manager. The
mean of the cost distribution is achieved by some subtraction
and division. The probability of inspector error and the
final cost of doing business is determined by goal
programming. The input for the goal constraints are obtained
from the decision maker. The result is a recommendation, by
task, for the use of inspector time such that the organization
goals are met as closely as possible.
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A curve fit on some experimental results done in the
1970 's on the relationship between time spent on a visual
inspection task and the accuracy of the inspector at
positively identifying existing errors yielded a curve of
P(IA) = v/^ ,
where P(IA) is the probability of inspector accuracy and
T is the time the inspector takes to inspect.
This is basically the curve used for all visual inspection
tasks in the illustrative problem used in this thesis. An
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area for future research is classifying different curves with
different levels of difficulty of the visual inspection. It
appears from the experimental results that with an increase
in difficulty in the visual task, the rate of improvement in
accuracy changes from increasing at a decreasing rate to
increasing at a slower, more constant rate. If error-prone
visual inspection tasks can be rated according to difficulty
and different accuracy curves can be generated for difficulty
levels then the model may be more valid.
Another area that may yield interesting results is
weighing of the various expert judgments using some criteria.
Suggested criteria that are readily discernable from the
respondents are time in service, time in the job, rank, and
skill qualification test score. Weighted judgments may yield
probabilities that are more reliable or verifiable than giving
each respondent equal weight in their input to unit error
probabilities. It may be determined that certain
qualifications are significantly more important than others
in the development of a gun chief.
The model developed is entirely deterministic. The model
develops probability and time estimates from several sources.
From the several estimates a distribution could be established
with a standard deviation on the mean point estimate. The
cost estimate procedure using PERT methods generates a Beta
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distribution for costs of each error. A simulation could be
developed incorporating the distributions from all the data
collected in this model which would yield a more robust
solution. By running the simulation a number of times,
confidence intervals for the various errors could be
generated.
This thesis put time and probability phenomena on an
interval scale of measurement by using paired comparisons and
indirect numerical estimation methods. The anchoring of that
interval scale to a ratio scale was done by direct numerical
estimation of some single phenomenon by the respondents.
Direct numerical estimation has flaws as a technique for
gathering data from operational personnel. An area for future
research would be to design an experiment and generate actual
values from empirical observation for the estimates which
anchor the interval scaled values to a ratio scale.
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APPENDIX A
GENERATING PROBABILITIES FOR CREW ERROR
The steps to generate probabilities for crew error using
expert judgment are given below with a numeric example taken
from survey input out of an active army unit.
1. Create a fault tree. See Figure 9. Worker errors
appear in the lowest, or first level. Errors are grouped by
worker, by work station, or by some other criteria that is
easily discernable by the inspector. Those criteria form a
second level of the fault tree and fall under the general
category of "error". "Error" and "no error" form the third
level of the tree.
2. Gather survey responses from inspectors. Inspectors
are called on to relay their firsthand knowledge of relative
frequencies of errors. Inspectors do pairwise comparisons as
to relative frequencies of errors within criteria groups.
When all groups have been judged then pairwise comparisons as
to relative frequencies are performed on the groups
themselves. Finally a direct numerical estimation is made by
the inspector as to the frequency of missions that occur which
have any error. A sample survey used in an artillery unit is
included in Appendix G.
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3. Turn survey responses into a reciprocal matrix. Ones
appear on the main diagonal. Survey responses of relative
frequencies fill the upper triangular matrix and their
reciprocals fill the corresponding positions in the lower
triangular matrix. See Table 2.
4. Derive the maximum eigenvalue and the eigenvector for
the reciprocal matrix. The eigenvector is the relative
frequency of each error from the perspective of one
respondent. See Table 3. The maximum eigenvalue is used in
Appendix C to derive a measure of consistency for the
respondent.
5. Turn frequency scores into probabilities. By
normalizing the eigenvector (making its components sum to one)
the probability for each error is derived, given that some
error within that group of errors did occur. See Table 4.
6. Across all consistent responses within a unit (use
method in Appendix C to establish consistency), average the
probability of each error type to make a unit probability.
See Table 5. Fill those unit average probabilities back on
the fault tree in the P(j), P(k), P(l), P(m), and P(n)
positions. See Figure 10.
7. Take the direct numerical estimates of the probability
for a fire mission containing an error of any sort. Average
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them for a unit probability of fire mission error. Fill this
value in on the fault tree in the P(ii) position.
8. Use the multiplicative rule down each branch of the
fault tree to derive a probability for each type of error on
the first level.
TABLE 3. RECIPROCAL MATRIX FOR GUNNER ERROR FREQUENCY.










1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00
1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
0.33 0.50 1.00 1.00
0.33 0.50 1.00 1.00
TABLE 4. EIGENVECTOR FOR THE RECIPROCAL MATRIX
error type 1 .718
error type 2 .587
error type 3 .263
error type 4 .263
TABLE 5. NORMALIZED EIGENVECTOR
Eigenvector normalized to make probabilities
error type 1 .39
error type 2 .33
error type 3 . 14
error type 4 .14
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE OF RESPONDENT'S ESTIMATES
Average of five consistent
respondents' probabilities.
error type 1 . 30
error type 2 .36
error type 3 .18
error type 4 .16
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Figure 9 - Probability of Crew Error Fault Tree
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Figure 10 - Probability of Crew Error Data
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APPENDIX B.
GENERATING COST ESTIMATES FOR ERROR
Crews make errors and inspectors fail to identify those
errors. The costs that result are measured in meters by which
the error is expected to cause the round to miss the target.
Each error has a maximum amount that it can cost the system.
That maximum is affected by such things as unit standard
operating procedures and unit safety measures which may
preclude an extreme error. One example is the M102 howitzer.
When traversed, the entire metal structure pivots on a ball
mounted to a base plate. If traverse limits exist for firing
safely then it is a common technique to drive metal stakes in
the ground abutting the metal structure when it is lined up
to fire on the left and right traverse limits thus physically
limiting the weapon to firing within safe traverse limits.
The result is an administrative method of precluding gross
firing errors to the left or right of the target area. This
naturally reduces the possible cost of traverse, or deflection
error.
Because there are many procedures in the field on five
different cannon weapon systems for precluding various firing
errors, there exist no minimum and maximum costs for crew
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errors that apply across the army. It is within the means of
senior personnel in each unit, however, to consider the unit's
procedures and weapon system to establish a minimum, maximum,
and modal value for each error type. The steps to take in
establishing the key values for each error type are reviewed.
1. Assume an average range at which targets are
engaged. Assume a charge with which those targets
are engaged.
2. Extract information from the tabular firing tables
( TFTs ) for the respective range and charge
assumed. Information to be extracted is the
effect (measured in meters) of a round that, when
fired, is off by:
a) 1 mil in elevation
b) 1 mil in deflection
c) 1 square weight
d) 1 charge of propellant
e) 0.1 second on time fuze setting
3. Consider unit procedures that effectively limit
the size of errors that can possibly be fired.
Determine a maximum amount of error that can be
set by a worker in terms of the items listed above
(mils, square weights, charges, seconds) and
convert that amount to meters on the ground.
4. Given that he must set an error, determine a
minimum amount of error that a crewman can
possibly set. For example, a crewman can set no
less than a one charge error without performing
perfectly in that regard. So the minimum possible
error for charge is that number of meters
corresponding to a one charge error.
5. Given that he must set an error, determine a mpst
likely error that can be fired.
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In the case of a 105 mm artillery unit at Fort Ord,
California, the following assumptions were made about the
potential costs of the various inspection task errors.
1) Safety Ts used,
2) Safety stakes employed,
3) Dog-legged safety box in impact area,
4) Charge 5 propellant required,
5) Range of target: 6,000 meters.
The following matrix was developed from the expertise of
several unit leaders.
TABLE 7. COST OF FIRING A CREW ERROR (IN METERS)
estimated from computed assuming
experience a Beta Distribution
Inspection Min Modal Max Mean Std
Task Cost Cost Cost Cost Devn
Gl 30 2400 420 400
G2 10 200 40 33
03 60 2400 440 400
G4 15 400 74 66
AG 20 2600 447 433
Al 950 1200 2400 1358 242
A2 25 30 100 41 12
A3 20 120 33 20
A4 100 2500 483 417
SI 10 120 2400 481 398
S2 15 130 2000 422 330
S3 25 260 2500 594 412
34 100 150 92 25
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APPENDIX C.
GENERATING TIMES FOR INSPECTION TASKS
Two methods are suggested by the NRC for generating
standard times for inspection tasks to be completed. One is
by measuring empirical observations and the other is by expert
judgment. Making empirical observations is the preferred
method and is the one suggested if a unit has the time and
resources to devote to an experiment to measure a number of
observations.
The steps to generate standard times for inspectors to
inspect for crew error (using expert judgment) are given below
with a numeric example taken from survey input out of an
active army unit.
1. Create a fault tree of crew tasks. See Figure 10.
Worker errors should appear in the lowest, or first level.
Errors are grouped by worker, by work station, or some other
criteria that is easily discernable by the inspector. Those
criteria form the second level of the fault tree.
2. Gather survey responses from inspectors. Inspectors
are called on to relay their firsthand knowledge of relative
lengths of time required to inspect for various errors.
Inspectors do pairwise comparisons as to relative lengths of
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time to inspect for errors within criteria groups. When all
groups have been judged then pairwise comparisons as to
relative lengths of time required to inspect the groups of
errors themselves are done. Finally a direct numerical
estimation or an empirical measurement is made by management
of the time required to inspect for one task.
3. Using the one task as a reference point, all other
tasks are given a length of time for inspection. When an
estimate exists for all tasks then a unit average is taken and
that becomes the standard inspection time for the unit.
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APPENDIX D
CONSISTENCY CHECKS ON SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS
The method for checking internal consistency of a set of
pairwise comparisons made by a respondent is reviewed. This
particularly applies to comparisons of relative frequency of
various events, such as event A is three times more likely
that event C.
1. Follow steps 1 through 4 of Appendix A to derive a
maximum eigenvalue for the respondent's reciprocal matrix.
2. Generate a consistency index (CI) for the respondent's
matrix by
[ >^max-N ] / [ N-1 ] = CI.
3
.
Generate a quantity of random reciprocal matrices of the
same dimension and containing the same range of values as was
possible to the respondents on the survey they were
administered. The main diagonal of these matrices are ones.
The upper triangular cells of the matrices are filled with
values picked at random from the possible range. Complete the
lower triangular cells with the corresponding reciprocal
values of the upper triangular cells. Compute the maximum
eigenvalue for each matrix and average all of the maximum
eigenvalues together. The result is an estimated maximum
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eigenvalue for a respondent who gives totally random responses
to the original survey.
4. Generate a consistency index for the random matrix
L^^random-I
[ ^MAXrandom " N ] / [ N - 1 ] = Clrandom'
5. Generate a consistency ratio by
If CR is less than or equal to .10 then there is a sufficient
level of internal consistency in the respondent's judgments
to consider them for analysis work [Ref 17, p. 83].
Step number three above requires some effort and
significant computer resources on the part of an analyst.
This step is made considerably easier if the analyst prepares
the respondent's survey so that only values between one and
nine (and their reciprocals) can be selected by the
respondent. The range of one to nine recurs frequently in
human judgments. For this range of values Saaty [Ref 17]
generated consistency indices (CI) for random reciprocal
matrices from size (3 X 3) to (10 X 10). Table 7 shows the
random consistency indices for matrices up to (10 X 10).
TABLE 8. Random Consistency Indices (Clj.^^^^,^)
N X N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CI^^ random 0.00 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49
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APPENDIX E
USING GAMS FOR GOAL PROGRAMMING
GAMS is used to perform the allocation of inspection time
by the Current Model and the Alternative Model.
1. The Current Model
In the Current Model the chief is aware of only the
inspection tasks he must perform, the relative frequency by
which the tasks are successful at discovering crew error, and
the relative amount of time it takes to perform the visual
tasks. Given only that much information the chief's strategy
is to stop as many crew mistakes as he can in the time
allowed. The assumption is made that the chief's intuition
works very well with the knowledge that he has and that he
does accomplish his objective of minimizing the probability
for a crew mistake. It is reemphasized that the chief does
not consider the relative magnitude of the costs of the
mistakes when he currently performs the pre-fire inspection.
The GAMS program for currently allocating inspection time is
labeled "Current Model".
2. The Alternative Model
The Alternative Model takes what the chief knows in
the Current Model and then takes into account the costs of the
errors. The purpose of the Alternative Model is to not make
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costly mistakes while meeting the commander's guidance for
fast and accurate fires. In the first tier of the preemptive
goal program any inspector error which has a minimum cost
greater than the commander's maneuver confidence radius (600
meters for the illustrative problem) is considered. Any first
tier error will certainly have a huge negative effect on the
artillery system. Every possibility for first tier error must
be precluded. This is done by placing a large weight (BPWT)
on any positive deviation from the accuracy goal.
In the second tier of the preemptive goal program any
inspector error which has a maximum cost greater than the
commander's maneuver confidence radius is considered. Any
second tier error potentially has a huge negative effect on
the artillery system. After first tier errors are precluded
then every possibility for a second tier error is precluded.
Again, this is done by placing a large weight (BPWT) on any
positive deviation from the accuracy goal.
In the third tier of the preemptive goal program all
remaining inspector errors are considered. Time that remains
after the first and second tier errors are precluded is now
allotted to the third tier inspection tasks. The commander
now weights timeliness of fire and accuracy of fire relative
to each other. In the illustrative problem the commander
chooses to weight them equally (TIMEWT = BPWT = 1.0).
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An asterisk in the first column of the GAMS computer
input is a line that the computer program does not read. In
the Alternative Model (2) asterisks are used in the PARAMETERS
part of the program so that only the inspector tasks for the
particular tier being considered are entered into the program.
The GAMS input for the Alternative Model's first tier (2) is
given. The second tier and third tier are the same programs
but different tasks are allowed or disallowed by using
asterisks. In each of the three tiers the SCALARS change to
reflect the tier. The first tier starts with 30 seconds of
time available (RESPTIME). The weights for time deviation
(TIMEWT) and accuracy deviation (BPWT) are 1:600. The second
tier starts with 28.2 seconds of time available. The weights
for time and accuracy deviation remain 1:600. The third tier
starts with 3.6 seconds of time available. The weights for
time and accuracy deviation become 1:1.
3. The Output
a) The Current Model output is shown first. The
allocation of time by the Current Model for each
inspection task is shown in the column labeled
LEVEL between the LOWER and UPPER limits. This
appears near the bottom of the page of GAMS
computer output.
b) The Alternative Model output is on three pages.
At the bottom of the first page is the allocation
of time for those tasks identified as in the first
tier ( task Al )
.
c) At the bottom of the second page is the allocation
of time for those tasks identified as in the
second tier (tasks Gl, G3, AG, A4, SI, S2, S3).
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d) At the bottom of the third page is the allocation
of time for those tasks identified as in the third






































































X these min times are theoretical; based on experiments of min time for
X eyes to focus and mind to grasp what eyes are seeing















X these times incorporate theoretical 1.5 times max values of standard
X time taken by gun chiefs to perform the task. This is time needed
X to insure (100/i) that task is done correctly.


























































87 X A chief does not consider the costs of various errors as he determines
88 ^ where he will spend his time during the inspection. His sole objective









99 X(I) time to be spent inspecting each task in battery








108 OBJDEF achievement function
109 TIIMIT time limit;
110 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
111 X this equation sums the probability for system error (which is a
112 X function of the decision variable) across all the visual inspection
113 X tasks AND assigns that sum a variable nam© of DEVIATION.
ll<i
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116 OBJDEF.. DEVIATION =E=
117 ( SUM ( I,
118 ( 1 - SQRT( (SQR(EPROB(I))) K (X( I )-MIN( I ) ) / (MAX(I)-MIN( I)) )
119 - NEPROB(I) ) ) );
120
121 XXXXXXXXXXX»XXX»XX)fKX)fXX)f*XXXXXXX»XXXXXXXXX)fX)fXXX9»XXXX¥KXXXXXXXXXXX
122 X ihis constraint limits time spent by the inspector across all visual
125 X inspection tasks to less than or equal to the commander's goal.
125 X SUBJECT TO
126 TLIMIT.. SUM ( I, X(I) ) =L= RESPTIME ;
127
128 X ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS involving min and max times allowed. These
129 X keep x in the feasible region as problem iterates^ otherwise stops
130
131 X.LO(I) = MIN(I)X1.01;
152 X.UP(I) = MAX(I);
155
15<i X If region is convex, then no matter where program starts, the
155 X solution will be the same. This forces program to start internally
156 X on the convex region because funny things happen on the edges
157
155 X.L(I) = MIN(I)X1.02
159 ;
1^0 MODEL GPNIP2 /ALL/;
l<4l SOLVE GPNLP2 USING NLP MINIMIZING DEVIATION;
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3 X THIS MODEL PERFORMS FI























IVE MODEL (first tier)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXKXXKXXXXXKXKKXXXXXXXXXXXXKXX
RST TIER OF PREEMPTIVE GP (ON THOSE TASKS WITH
THE MANEUVER CONFIDENCE RADIUS = 600m)
.wt. bp.wt
1 / 600 /
XXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX











X these min times are th
X eyes to focus and min
K*XXXXXXXXX)'¥XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
eoretical; based on experiments of min time for
d to grasp what eyes are seeing
















X these times. incorporat
X time taken by gun ch
XXXXXXXX*XX)*)fXXXXXXXX*XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)f)'¥
e theoretical 1.5 times max values of "normal"
iefs to perform the task. This is time needed
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The Alternative Model (continued)
ill
GPNLP2
to incur* (.100'/.) that task is dona correctly.














































































































118 X these costs are derived using 2 criteria. First - mean cost is based
119 X on data from firing tables assuming range to target 6000 meters, and
120 X beta distribution (pert estimation techniques). Second - max cost
121 X is based on data derived from firing tables.
122
125 MCOST(I) mean cost of error i - detm by PERT Beta distn techn
12'^
125
126 X SET 2 (max costs)
127 /
128 X Gl 2^00
129 X 02 200
130 X 03 2400
131 X C<i <iOO
132 X AG 2600.
133 Al 2<»00.
134 X A2 100.
135 X A3 120.
136 X A4 2500.
137 X SI 2400.
138 X S2 2000.
139 X S3 2500.





145 RESPTIME total time allowed for guns to shoot / 30.0/
146 BPARK number meters in which aimpoint must be / 000/
147 TIMEWT weight placed on time pos devn in OBJ / 1.0/




152 X(I) time to be spent inspecting each task in battery
153 TOFF deviation from the time goal constraint
154 BPOFF deviation from the ballpark goal constraint








163 OBJDEF achievement function
164 TLIMIT time limit

































( TIMEWT X TPOS ) + C BPWT X BPPOS );
XKKXXXXXKXXKXXXKXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXKXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X SUBJECT TO
TLIMIT.. SUM ( I, X(I) ) - TPOS + TNEG =E= RESPTIME ;
DLIMIT. . SUM ( I,
( 1 - SQRT( (SQR(EPROB(I))) x (X(I)-MIN(I)) / (MAX( I)-MIN( I) ) )
- NEPROB(I) ) X MCOST(I) ) -BPPOS + BPNEG =E= BPARK ;
XXIOfXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXX^^XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXyyXXXX^tXXXXX
X ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS involvino min end max ^imes allowed. These
X keep X in the feasible region as problem iterates/ otherwise stops
X.LO(I) = MIN(I)X1.01;
X.UP(I) = MAX(I)>
X if region is convex, then no matter where starts, soln should be same




SOLVE GPNLP2 USING HLP MINIMIZING DEVIATION;
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3. The Output
a. The Current Model
GPNLP2
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EXIT -- OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOUND
MAJOR ITERATIONS 1
NORM RG / NORM PI 5.001E-09
TOTAL USED 0.28 UNITS
MIN0S5 TIME 0.17 (INTERPRETER - 0.05)




















TIME TO BE SPENT INSPECTING EACH TASK IN BATTERY
LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
Gl 0.7070 2.2*427 2.8000 EPS
G2 0.7070 2.5660 3.2000 EPS
G3 0.7070 1 .0000 1.0000 -0.0056
C^ 0.7070 1.6000 1.6000 -0.0001
AG 2.0200 7.2167 8.9000 ,
Al 0.7070 1 .8000 1 .8000 -0.0029
A2 0.7070 1.7816 ^.8000 EPS
A3 0.7070 1.7000 1 .7000 -0. 00^12
A<4 0.7070 3.^000 3.^000 -0.0011
SI 0.7070 1.H17 3.0000 EPS
S2 0.7070 ' 2.0000 2.0000 -0.0001
S3 0.7070 2.1513 •3.5000 EPS
S<i 0.7070 l.<i000 1.^000 -0.0037
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
VAR DEVIATION -INF 0.0151 + INF .
115
b. The Alternative Model's First Tier.
GPNLP2
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EXIT -- OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOUND
MAJOR ITERATIONS ^6
NORM RG / NORM PI O.OOOE+00
TOTAL USED 0.<t5 UNITS
MIN0S5 TIME 0.39 (INTERPRETER - 0.01)
















































The Alternative Model's Second Tier.
GPNLP2





















MINOS VERSION 5.0 APR 198<i
COURTESY OF B. A. MURTAGH AND M. A. SAUNDERS,
DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
STANFORD CALIFORNIA 9'»305 U.S.A.






EXIT -- OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOUND
MAJOR ITERATIONS <il
NORM RG / NORM PI O.OOOE+00
TOTAL USED 0.60 UfJITS
MIN0S5 TIME 0.51 (INTERPRETER - 0.06)










































































The Alternative Model's Third Tier.
GPHLP2
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EXIT -- OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOUND
MAJOR ITERATIONS 13
NORM RG / NORM PI 8.<463E-08
TOTAL USED 0.32 UNITS






















TIME TO BE SPENT INSPECTING EACH TASK IN BATTERY
LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
G2 0.7070 1.050'i 3.2000 EPS
e<i 0.7070 l.<i691 1 .6000 ,
A2 0.7070 0.7508 <i.8000 EPS
A3 0.7070 1.278<i 1 .7000 EPS
S4 0.7070 1.2390 l.<iOOO EPS
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
VAR DEVIATION -INF <<.810<i + IflF
VAR TPOS . 2.1877 + irjF EPS
VAR TNEG , . + iriF 1.0000
VAR BPPOS
.
2!6227 + INF .




A. Human Reliability Terminology
1. "Consequence of interest (COI)" is analogous to
measure of effectiveness (MOE). MOE is used when
the concern is maximizing effectiveness of some
positive performance whereas COI is used when the
concern is minimizing consequences of some
negative performance (for example: human error).
2. "Human error" is any member of a set of human
actions that exceeds some limit of acceptability.
The set of actions must be defined and the
tolerance limits must be established for there to
be human error. [Ref 10, p. 6]
3. "Human error probability" is the chance that a
given task will not be successfully completed by
personnel within a required minimum time (if a
time requirement exists). This is the reciprocal
of human reliability.
4. "Human reliability" is the probability that a task
will be completed successfully by personnel within
a specified minimum time (if a time requirement
exists). [Ref 1, p. 221]
5. "Worker" is the human on the production line who
performs the error-prone tasks that potentially
effect the finished product. A mistake by a
worker that potentially leads to a flawed product
is referred to as an "error".
6. "Inspector" is the human tasked to find faulty
finished products before they leave the production
line. A mistake by an inspector that leads to a
flawed product is referred to as a "failure".
7. "System error" is a worker error which evades
detection by the inspector and has a cost that is
of consequence of interest to the system. A





1. A "chief" is the senior man in a crew of men who
operate a gun.
2. "Fire(s)", when used as a noun, refers to the
shooting of artillery munitions.
3. A "fire mission" is an order from higher authority
to shoot one or more rounds of artillery at a
target.
4. A "gun" refers to a single artillery cannon weapon
system.
5. "Gunnery" refers to the group of skills required
of crewmen to fire their weapon.
6. "Maneuver", when used as a noun, refers to
infantry or armor elements to which the artillery
provides fire support.
7. A "round" is synonymous with the term projectile.
8. A "unit" refers to a battery of artillery. A





SURVEYS ADMINISTERED TO RESPONDENTS
The collection of the expert judgments from operational
personnel was key to solving the illustrative problem. The
error probability survey and the time use survey were the two
surveys given to the respondents. Respondents were briefed
in person prior to working on the survey. The surveys took
approximately 45 minutes to complete.
The error probability survey requires a gun chief to
compare pairs of errors as to their relative likelihood of
occurrence. The comparisons are made among similar type
errors within the hierarchical areas defined in Figure 9 in
Appendix A. The gun chief is also required to make one direct
numerical estimate on the likelihood that his section sets any
type of error. The process by which these survey results are
turned into probabilities is discussed in Appendix A. The
method by which the respondent's judgments are checked for
consistency is discussed in Appendix D.
The time use survey requires a gun chief to compare the
amount of time taken to perform one inspection task relative
another. Comparisons are made among similar type tasks within
hierarchical areas defined in Figure 9 in Appendix A. One
inspection task which is routinely done in a relatively
uniform manner among all gun chiefs is the inspection of the
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gunner's sight picture on the gun's aiming reference point.
It is assumed that this task takes 2.0 seconds to perform.
Using that known value, all other visual inspection tasks are
scaled accordingly. The process by which the tasks are scaled
from the survey results is discussed in Appendix C.
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1. The Error Probability Survey,
FREQUENCY BY WHICH ERRORS OCCUR
(gunner, asst gunner, ammo handlers, FDC)
Which crew element (the one on the left or the one on the
right) is most likely to make an error that you must have
corrected prior to firing? How many times more likely is the
more error-prone element to make an error than the less error-
prone element? (Assume daylight firing, shell HE, fuze TIME,
Low Angle; with collimator, gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )
WHICH IS MORE LIKELY ?
how many times
ERROR as likely? ERROR
























Indicate below the number of "good" missions to each
mission that you must get involved in making a correction on
either the gunner, asst gunner, ammo handlers, or FDC (a
"faulty" mission is one in which you must get involved to keep
shooting accurate. )
j
How many times as likely
I
are good missions to each faulty mission?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50 60 >70
faulty
I I I I I I I I I I I I i I
mission |_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|. i goodI mission
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GUNNER ERRORS
Which error (the one on the left or the one on the right) is
most likely to occur (prior to your safety inspection) in your gun
section? How many more times likely is the more frequent event
than the less frequent event? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator,
gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )




ERROR as likely? ERROR
























Which error (the one on the left or the one on the right) is
most likely to occur (prior to your safety inspection) in your gun
section? How many more times likely is the more frequent event
than the less frequent event? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator and
gunner's quadrant.)
( make one "X" per comparison below )

















4 5 6 7 8
ERROR
>9 in:
counter = = elev
bubble
counter = = cr Ivl
bubble
















Which error (the one on the left or the one on the right) is
most likely to occur (prior to your safety inspection) in your gun
section? How many more times likely is the more frequent event
than the less frequent event? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator,
gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )




in: >9 8 7
how many times
as likely?65432 23456 ERROR7 8 >9 in:
charge = = shell
type
charge = = fuze
type

















(data is off of Safety T)
Which error (the one on the left or the one on the right)
is most likely to occur? How many more times likely is the more
frequent event than the less frequent event? (Assume daylight
firing, good conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with
collimator, gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )


















































2. The Time Use Survey.
COMPARISON OF TIME TAKEN TO PERFORM
SAFETY CHECKS ON CREW
Which check (the one on the left or the one on the right)
consumes more of your time? How many more seconds does it take to
make the longer check verses the shorter check in each of the six
comparisons listed below? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator,
gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )
WHICH CHECK IS MORE
TIME CONSUMING
increased number of seconds it takes to do one task vs the other





















Which check (the one on the left or the one on the right)
consumes more of your time? How many more seconds does it take to
make the longer check verses the shorter check in each of the six
comparisons listed below? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator,
gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )
( only mark six "X"s on this form )
WHICH CHECK IS MORE
TIME CONSUMING
increased number of seconds it takes to do one task vs the other
























Which check (the one on the left or the one on the right)
consumes more of your time? How many more seconds does it take to
make the longer check verses the shorter check in each of the six
comparisons listed below? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator,
gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )
WHICH CHECK IS MORE
TIME CONSUMING
increased number of seconds it takes to do one task vs the other
#sec >8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >8 #sec
charge = = time
setting
charge = = fuze
type
charge = = shell
type/wt/lot
time = = fuze
setting type
time — — shell
setting type/wt/lot





Which check (the one on the left or the one on the right)
consumes more of your time? How many more seconds does it take to
make the longer check verses the shorter check in each of the six
comparisons listed below? (Assume daylight firing, good
conditions, shell HE, fuze TIME, Low Angle; with collimator,
gunner's quadrant, and safety T.
)
( make one "X" per comparison below )
WHICH CHECK IS MORE
TIME CONSUMING
increased number of seconds it takes to do one task vs the other
#sec >8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >8 #sec
deflec- quad-
tion rant
deflec- = = time for
tion fuze
deflec- = = ammo:
tion chg/sh/f
z
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